OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

   FENNELLY

   delivered on 6 July 1995 ( [1]*1 )

   1.

   Three licences for the opening of new shops in rwo Italian towns have
   been refused by reason of a commercial planning system established by
   Italian law. The Court has to consider the compatibility with Community
   competition law of this type of State intervention.

   A -- The Italian Law at issue

   2.

   The Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto, Seconda Sezione,
   has referred questions relating to the compatibility with Articles 85,
   86 and 30 of the Treaty of Italian Law No 426 of 11 June 1971 (`the
   Law') concerning the regulation of retail trading licences. ( [2]1 )

   3.

   The Law subjects the opening of a shop for the retail sale of certain
   goods to the grant of a trading licence issued by the mayor of the
   commune in question. The latter must take into account the criteria
   provided for in Anieles 11 and 12 of the Law and consult the committee
   provided for in Articles 15 and 16.

   4.

   Article 11 requires each municipal council to draw up a plan for the
   development and transformation of the commercial network, with the
   stated purpose of ensuring that consumers are served as well and as
   efficiently as possible. It also requires that the plan should, as far
   as possible, provide for a balance between permanent trading
   establishments and the likely extent of demand by the habitually
   resident and floating population, taking into account the activities of
   mobile street vendors and other customary forms of distribution.
   According to Article 12, the plan must fix the maximum extent of the
   commercial network for the distribution of what are described as goods
   of wide and general consumption, in respect of each specified class of
   goods, so as to promote the development and the productivity of the
   system and to ensure free competition and a balance between the various
   forms of distribution. ( [3]2 ) The plan should be revised by the
   municipal council every four years.

   5.

   Articles 15 and 16 provide for the composition of committees whose
   opinion must be sought both for the approval of the development plan
   and for the granting of individual trading licences. In communes of
   more than 50000 inhabitants, or which are the administrative centre of
   a province, the committee consists of fifteen members; in other cases
   ten. The composition of fifteen-member committees is:

   (i)

   the mayor or his delegate who acts as chairman;

   (ii)

   two experts on urban planning and traffic circulation assigned by the
   municipal council;

   (iii)

   the director of `UPICA' (a public provincial office representing
   industry, commerce and artisans);

   (iv)

   one representative of the provincial tourist office;

   (v)

   one representative of the chamber of commerce;

   (vi)

   five persons, described as experts on distribution problems, appointed
   by the traders' organizations concerned, of whom three are appointed by
   the union of shopkeepers with fixed premises (one representing the
   major distributors), one is appointed by the consumers' cooperative
   organizations ( [4]3 ) and one by the union of stallholders;

   (vi)

   four representatives nominated by the national workers' confederation.

   6.

   The ten-member committees include three (as distinct from five) experts
   on distribution problems who are appointed by the municipal council;
   although the views of traders' and consumers' cooperative organizations
   must be taken into account they do not, in the case of these
   committees, make the appointment. Furthermore, on these smaller
   committees neither UPICA nor the provincial tourist office is
   represented, and there are only three workers' representatives. These
   last are appointed by the municipal council on the advice of the
   workers' confederation. Finally, the smaller committees include a
   representative of the social security office.

   7.

   Arnele 23 of the Law requires the mayor to obtain the opinion of the
   committee on all individual licence applications, regardless of whether
   they be to set up, transfer or extend a trading concern. Generally this
   opinion is advisory only and does not bind the mayor. However, Article
   43 of the Law provides that, during the transitional period, before the
   development plan has been approved and, also, after a plan has lapsed
   but before the adoption of a new one, the grant of a licence (whether
   it be to set up, transfer or extend a shop) is subject to the approval
   of the committee. Thus, it is only in the absence of a current
   development plan that the opinion of the committee is binding.

   8.

   It appears that the Law was amended by Decree-Law No 384 of 18 April
   1994. ( [5]4 ) As the amendments were made subsequent to the disputes
   giving rise to the present references, they are not germane to
   consideration of the issues before the Court. ( [6]5 ) Furthermore, the
   Court was informed at the oral hearing that the Law was to be the
   subject of one of a series of national referendums to be held on 11
   June 1995 at which the Italian people would have the right to vote for
   its abolition. I understand that the proposal to repeal the Law has
   been rejected, but this is also irrelevant.

   B -- Factual circumstances and questions

   9.

   In the present cases the applicants in the main proceedings (`the
   applicants') applied unsuccessfully for trading licences. In Case
   C-140/94, D. I. P. S. p. A. applied to the municipality of Bassano del
   Grappa for a trading licence to open a shop for the sale of watches and
   jewellery. ( [7]6 ) The remaining cases concern the Commune of
   Chioggia, which is a large commune for the purposes of the Law. In Case
   C-141/94, S. r. 1. LIDL Italia applied for a trading licence for the
   sale of hardware products for domestic use, whereas in Case C-142/94 S.
   r. 1. LINGRAL applied for a trading licence for the sale of goods
   included in the List of Marketable Goods No II of the Law. ( [8]7 )

   10.

   In Case C-140/94, the application was refused on the ground that the
   development plan in force in the municipality did not provide for the
   issue of new licences in respect of the goods to which the application
   related. In the other two cases, it was refused on the ground that the
   development plan had lapsed and the opinions of. the committee, binding
   in those cases, were adverse.

   11.

   The applicants challenged the decisions rejecting their applications
   for trading licences before the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per
   il Veneto, Seconda Sezione, which referred the present questions to the
   Court. The three orders were received at the Registry of the Court on
   24 May 1994. By order of the President of the Court made on 29 June
   1994, the three cases were joined for the purposes of the written and
   oral procedure.

   12.

   The Tribunale Amministrativo has referred the following two questions
   pursuant to Article 177(2) of the Treaty:

   `Whether Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty give rise to a prohibition on
   the introduction by a Member State of:

   1.

   legislation providing for a planning forecast for the commercial
   network incorporating predetermined lists of goods subject to quotas,
   thus precluding the opening of new shops when the market is deemed, in
   accordance with the plan, to be adequately served already;

   2.

   legislation requiring an opinion to be obtained from a collective body
   whose members include representatives of traders already operating on
   the market both when the plan is drawn up and when new licences are
   granted.'

   In Case C-141/94 the national court also refers to Article 30 of the
   Treaty on the ground that the plaintiff in the main proceedings is a
   subsidiary of a company established in another Member State.

   13.

   By the first question, the national court asks, in effect, whether
   Articles 11 and 12 of the Law are compatible with Articles 85 and 86 of
   the Treaty. The orders for reference state that Articles 11 and 12 of
   the Law give communes the power to plan the number of commercial
   outlets for each class of marketable goods without previous
   investigation and that this leads to the automatic exclusion of new
   businesses from the market once the relevant list of outlets for
   selling the particular category of marketable goods has been filled in
   accordance with the forecasts made in the development plan.

   14.

   The referring court asks whether the system constitutes a restriction
   on competition on the ground that the ability of an undertaking to
   enter the market is not determined by the forces of supply and demand,
   but, primarily, by the advance forecasts made every four years by the
   administrative authorities as to the likely extent of demand, having
   regard to the needs of the habitually resident and floating population.
   Alternatively, it asks whether the system of licensing in question
   could result in the undertakings, which already operate in the market,
   gaining a dominant position which they might abuse by imposing selling
   prices which are unfair or, in any case, different from those which
   would be applicable in conditions of perfect competition.

   15.

   By the second question, the referring court essentially questions the
   compatibility with Article 85 of the Treaty of the role of the
   committees under the Law and, particularly, the requirement contained
   in Articles 15 and 16 of the Law that they must be consulted on the
   granting of trading licences and in relation to the drawing up of the
   development plan referred to in Article 11 of the Law. ( [9]8 )

   16.

   The referring court states that Article 24 of the Law, by requiring the
   mayor to seek the opinion of the committee in relation to all licence
   applications, directly involves the representatives of traders, already
   operating in the market, in the decision-making process regarding the
   commercial proposals of their competitors, and that it may reasonably
   be assumed that those who have an interest in opposing the opening of a
   new shop will do so. Similarly, with regard to the formulation of a
   development plan, the Law provides for the mandatory consultation of a
   committee which includes members with an economic interest in opposing
   the enlargement of the commercial distribution network and the entry of
   business competitors on the market. The national court states that the
   Law has considerable potential, if not actual, limiting effects on the
   extent of competition on the Italian retail market.

   17.

   Case C-141/94 raises the possibility of the provisions of the Law being
   contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty. Having made an express reference
   to the fact that the applicant in this case, S. r. 1. LIDL Italia, is
   the Italian subsidiary of a German company, which suffers adversely as
   a result of the Law, the national court proceeds to query, in
   particular, whether the requirement that a person may open a shop, only
   in accordance with the forecasts made in the development plan, may
   constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to that of a
   quantitative restriction on imports contrary to Article 30, since it
   could potentially restrict trade between Member States. ( [10]9 )

   C -- Observations of the Parties

   18.

   The Court received observations only from the applicants and the
   Commission.

   (i) The Applicants

   19.

   The applicants submit, in reference to the first question, that the Law
   has, in itself, significant anticompetitive effects on the retail
   market in Italy. It restricts competition because it allows the
   national administrative authorities to interfere with the free play of
   market forces by refusing private economic operators the right to enter
   the market, on the ground that the existing traders are capable of
   satisfying consumer demand. They claim that in its judgments in Meng, (
   [11]10 )Reiff ( [12]11 ) and Ohra ( [13]12 ) the Court did not exclude
   the possibility that a national legislative measure might in itself be
   contrary to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, if it was such as to
   deprive those articles of their effectiveness.

   20.

   The applicants state that, while it might be permissible to restrict
   access to the market for reasons concerning hygiene, safety or town
   planning, it is not, however, permissible to do so by a system which
   determines in advance the extent of retail selling space. Articles
   3(g), 85 and 86 of the Treaty do not allow the national authorities to
   determine in advance the level of supply of such selling space which,
   in a market where conditions of free competition prevail, should result
   only from the interplay of market forces.

   21.

   The applicants submit that the anticompetitive effects of the Law are
   not limited geographically to the various municipalities and that the
   Law affects inter-State trade as required for Articles 85 and 86 of the
   Treaty to be applicable. The Law applies across Italy. ( [14]13 ) Given
   that there is a single commercial market in Italy, the applicants claim
   that the Court can presume the existence of agreements between
   undertakings at national level which are reinforced by the Law at local
   level. They submit that even anticompetitive conduct which does not
   have a direct effect on trade between Member States may fall within the
   scope of the application of Articles 85 and 86 once it has the
   potential of affecting such trade in accordance with the judgment of
   the Court in Batista Morais. ( [15]14 )

   22.

   The applicants submit, in reference to the second question, that, even
   if it were accepted that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty do not
   prohibit national legislative or administrative measures as such, the
   system established by the Law is incompatible with these articles
   because it not only favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or
   concerted practices among private undertakings contrary to Article 85
   and reinforces their effects but, also, in fact, presupposes the
   existence of such conduct. This behaviour is rendered decisive because,
   not only is it mandatory to seek the opinion of the committee, but the
   opinion is effectively binding in practice, as the mayor departs from
   it only in exceptional circumstances (even where he or she enjoys a
   discretion), and may not do so without giving reasons. ( [16]15 )

   23.

   Finally, they submit that the Italian State has deprived the Law of its
   official character by delegating to private traders responsibility for
   taking decisions affecting the economic sphere. ( [17]16 ) At the oral
   hearing, it was stated that the committees are in reality controlled by
   representatives of economic operators already existing on the market
   and are not constrained by any public interest criteria in formulating
   what are almost invariably negative opinions on applications for
   newlicences. ( [18]17 )

   (ii) The Commission

   24.

   With regard to Article 85 of the Treaty, the Commission states that the
   alleged restriction of competition is not the result of any concerted
   practices or agreements but flows directly from the Law and the
   administrative acts adopted for its implementation. The Commission
   refers to the judgments of the Court in Meng, Reiff and Ohra, ( [19]18
   ) which it regards as exhaustive and definitive. It observes that the
   Court held in those cases that Article 85 is, in itself, concerned
   solely with the conduct of undertakings and not with measures adopted
   by Member States by law, regulation or otherwise. However, it accepts
   that Article 85, read in conjunction with Article 5, requires the
   Member States not to introduce or to maintain in force measures, even
   of a legislative nature, which may render ineffective the competition
   rules applicable to undertakings. This would be the case if a Member
   State were to require or to favour the adoption of agreements,
   decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85, to reinforce
   their effects or to deprive its own rules of the character of
   legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility
   for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere. ( [20]19 )

   25.

   The Commission states that the judgments of the Court in Meng, Reiffand
   Ohra demonstrate that measures adopted by a Member State do not
   infringe Article 85 of the Treaty solely by virtue of the fact that
   they produce effects equivalent to those produced by an agreement
   prohibited by that article. Such measures would infringe Article 85
   only if a Member State delegated to private economic operators
   responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere.
   However, the committees provided for in Articles 15 and 16 of the Law
   act in a consultative capacity only, the decision being taken by the
   mayor. The Commission points out that, in taking a decision, the mayor
   must observe the criteria fixed by the development plan and,
   consequently, where the opinion of the committee departs from those
   criteria, the mayor must ignore it. It is only in those cases where no
   such plan exists (including where an existing plan has lapsed) that the
   opinion is binding.

   26.

   Even where the mayor is bound to follow the opinion of the committee,
   it cannot be said that the provisions of the Law are contrary to
   Article 85 of the Treaty since the representatives of the existing
   traders are in a minority on the relevant committee. The Commission
   thus concludes that the Law is not contrary to Articles 5 and 85. (
   [21]20 )

   27.

   The Commission also observes that the Law is not incompatible with
   Article 86 of the Treaty. It is neither inevitable nor even probable
   that the regime established by the Law will lead to the existing
   undertakings having a dominant position in the market. In fact, that is
   rather unlikely to be the case given the geographical level at which
   the Law operates.

   28.

   With regard to Article 30 of the Treaty, the Commission states that,
   although the requirement to obtain a licence may restrict the total
   number of retail selling establishments, it does not necessarily
   restrict the volume of trade; nor does it render more difficult or
   expensive the importation of goods from other Member States. It
   suggests that the judgment of the Court in Keck and Mithouard is
   inapplicable to this case. ( [22]21 ) Since the trading licence has to
   be obtained before any goods are sold and is concerned with the very
   existence of the shop, it is not concerned with `selling arrangements'
   as understood in that case. The Commission refers to the judgment of
   the Court in Matteo Peralta ( [23]22 ) and claims that the provisions
   of the Law do not infringe Article 30 because:

   (i)

   they make no distinction according to the origin of the goods;

   (ii)

   their purpose is not to regulate trade in goods with other Member
   States;

   (iii)

   the restrictive effects which they may have on the free movement of
   goods are too uncertain and indirect to render them capable of
   hindering trade between Member States.

   D -- Consideration of the first question

   29.

   In its first question, the national court proceeds from the assumption,
   advanced by the applicants in the main action, that the Law institutes
   a system, which is inherently inimical to the operation of competitive
   forces in retail trading, throughout Italy. In essence, it is asking
   whether the existence of such a system in one Member State is contrary
   to the Treaty. It cannot, indeed, be denied that the Italian licensing
   system goes beyond the mere reconciliation of retail trading to
   physical planning objectives. Such planning laws, as they exist in the
   Member States, implement physical planning objectives with
   environmental interests in view, such as preservation of historic
   buildings, traffic and pollution control, efficient provision of public
   services and respect for aesthetic or other standards. Community law
   interacts with such national laws. ( [24]23 ) The applicants accept the
   legitimacy of licensing control on such grounds. The Law at issue here
   is of quite a different kind. The municipal plan limits the physical
   extent (in terms of quantity of selling space) permitted for the sale
   of classes of goods, based, not on any physical planning criteria, but
   on forecasts of consumer demand for goods made by those responsible for
   drafting and adopting the plan. It is clearly arguable that such a
   system jeopardizes the `equality of opportunity that must be preserved
   for all operators', but its operation is restricted to the Italian
   market. ( [25]24 )

   30.

   This first question is framed in terms of the compatibility of the Law
   with Articles 5, 85 and 86 of the Treaty. While the Court is not
   competent, within the framework of a preliminary reference under
   Article 177 of the Treaty, to determine the validity, having regard to
   Community law, of provisions of national law, it has jurisdiction, in
   pursuance of the duty of judicial cooperation provided for by that
   article and on the basis of the material presented to it, to provide a
   national court with information on the interpretation of Community law,
   which may be useful to the latter in assessing the effects, including
   the validity, of the impugned provisions. ( [26]25 ) Essentially the
   question may, therefore, be reformulated as raising the compatibility
   with Articles 5, 85 and 86 of a national measure -which is designed to
   regulate, through the adoption at regional, provincial or local level
   of development plans, the total number of retail outlets which may be
   licensed to operate within such regions, provinces or localities for
   the sale of specified categories of marketable goods.

   31.

   The institution and maintenance of a system ensuring that competition
   on the internal market is not distorted is a `prerequisite for the
   proper functioning of the Common Market which is the rock on which
   economic integration is to be founded' ( [27]26 ) and is `indispensable
   for the achievement of the Community's tasks'. ( [28]27 ) This
   conclusion flows from Article 3(g), formerly 3(f), of the Treaty,
   adopting this objective for the Community and it affects the
   interpretation of other more detailed Treaty provisions on the subject.
   In pursuit of that objective Articles 85 and 86 impose certain
   obligations on undertakings, and, in their own terms, only on
   undertakings, to refrain from anticompetitive conduct capable of
   affecting trade between Member States. The Treaty thus regards the
   maintenance of effective competition between undertakings as an
   essential means of giving effect to the goal of Article 3(g). No
   similar obligation is placed on Member States who retain the
   competence, subject to the constraints of other Treaty provisions, such
   as Articles 9, 30, 52 and 59, to name but a few, to enact measures
   which alter or affect, in the national public interest, the free play
   of competitive forces on their domestic markets.

   32.

   At this point, it becomes clear that the decision on this question
   requires a careful review of the position of Member States in the face
   of Treaty obligations addressed, not to them, but to undertakings
   engaged in trade in the internal market. While the transfer of
   sovereignty implied by membership of the Community does not deprive the
   Member States of their power to legislate in respect of matters not
   affected by the Treaty, it goes without saying that they may not adopt
   laws which directly conflict with Treaty provisions. ( [29]28 ) Nor may
   they act so as to deprive Community law of its full and uniform
   application. ( [30]29 ) In what was described as a remarkable turning
   point in the Court's case-law in this field, ( [31]30 ) the Court in
   its judgment in INNO v ATAB ( [32]31 ) stated, in reliance on Article
   3(f), as it then was, and Article 5(2) of the Treaty that:

   `While it is true that Article 86 is directed at undertakings,
   nonetheless it is also true that the Treaty imposes a duty on Member
   States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure that could deprive
   that provision of its effectiveness.'

   33.

   Accordingly, in what is now a wellestablished line of case-law
   (considered further in reference to the second question), it has been
   held that Member States are bound by Article 5 of the Treaty to abstain
   from adopting any measures, including legislative measures, which could
   jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.
   Consequently, since Articles 85 and 86 are concerned with the
   maintenance of effective competition between undertakings, Member
   States must not undermine the full application and effectiveness of
   these articles. This does not prevent them from regulating competitive
   conditions on their domestic markets in the pursuit of public interest
   objectives defined in national law.

   34.

   The Court in the notable Meng, Reiff and Ohra ( [33]32 ) cases did not
   accept the argument, based largely on certain academic writings, that
   Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty could be invoked, in conjunction with
   Article 5(2) of the Treaty, against any legislative or other regulatory
   action on the part of Member States operating in a manner similar to,
   or having effects analogous to, anticompetitive conduct between
   undertakings. ( [34]33 ) Expressing itself in identical terms in each
   ruling, the Court referred to the consistent case-law in which it had
   confirmed that Article 85 applied only to the conduct of undertakings,
   while also confirming that, read in conjunction with Article 5 of the
   Treaty, it requires Member States not to introduce or maintain in force
   measures which may have the result of rendering ineffective the
   competition rules which apply to undertakings. ( [35]34 )

   35.

   The Court in each of the above cases assessed whether the various rules
   at issue could be regarded as having such an effect. While it must be
   said that the Court expressly refrained from any categoric attempt to
   define the types of situations where national measures might have such
   an effect, the Opinions of Advocates General Tesauro and Darmon contain
   a comprehensive analysis of the Court's case-law and a detailed, and
   ultimately harmonious, conclusion that the Treaty does not prohibit
   State measures merely for their anticompetitive effect, when that
   effect has no link with the conduct of undertakings, that is to say
   when it does not in any way cloak, directly or indirectly, conduct --
   actual and not merely ostensible conduct -- on the part of
   undertakings. ( [36]35 )

   36.

   The justification for not applying Article 85 of the Treaty to Member
   States in the absence of some link with concerted conduct on the part
   of private economic operators may be summarized as follows:

   (i)

   Article 3(g) cannot be regarded as imposing any definitive or binding
   obligations on Member States although it defines an objective which is
   to be pursued through other Treaty provisions; ( [37]36 )

   (ii)

   similarly, Article 5(2) which requires Member States to `abstain from
   any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of
   this Treaty', contains an obligation of a general kind, whose precise
   application normally depends on the subsequent, more specific
   provisions of the Treaty and cannot, in any event, be invoked by
   individuals before national courts to oppose allegedly anticompetitive
   national measures; ( [38]37 )

   (iii)

   to invalidate national laws solely because of their anticompetitive
   effects would widen the scope of Article 85, which, in its application
   to undertakings, requires proof of the existence of an agreement or
   concerted practice;

   (iv)

   Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, in contrast with other directly
   effective Treaty provisions, are addressed only to undertakings, and
   should not necessarily be interpreted so as to prevent Member States
   from regulating competition on a particular domestic market in a manner
   which does not operate to hinder inter-State trade;

   (v)

   Member States are subject to a specific duty pursuant to Article 90 of
   the Treaty not to adopt measures which enable or facilitate
   undertakings, upon which they have conferred special or exclusive
   rights, to act in contravention of the Treaty competition rules, but
   this does not impose on them a general prohibition of regulating
   private economic operators with whom they have no special relationship;

   (vi)

   the important question of exemption from the provisions of Article 85
   presents major problems in the present context. On the one hand, the
   Commission has exclusive competence; on the other, Article 85(3) does
   not cater for the exemption of State measures. By contrast, in the case
   of other Treaty provisions addressed to Member States, such as Article
   36, the Court is competent to assess whether measures restrictive of
   trade contrary to Articles 30 to 34 can be justified. To use Advocate
   General Van Gerven's words: ( [39]38 )

   `Central to Community competition policy is the Commission. Article 9
   of Regulation No 17 gives the Commission exclusive competence to
   declare the provisions of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty to be
   inapplicable on the basis of Article 85(3); it may exercise this power
   by means of an individual decision or, where it is authorized to do so
   by the Council, by means of a generic exemption regulation ... .

   It is not for the national court or for the Court of Justice to extend
   the content of a block exemption beyond the normal interpretation of
   those provisions: the Commission has sole competence to declare Article
   85(1) to be inapplicable by virtue of Article 85(3). The courts do not
   have that power';

   (vii)

   in the majority of cases where anticompetitive national measures,
   giving support to private concerted behaviour affecting inter-State
   trade, are adopted by Member States, individuals will have the right to
   challenge such measures before their national courts pursuant to the
   directly effective Treaty provisions addressed to Member States; (
   [40]39 )

   (viii)

   it must not be overlooked that Article 101 of the Treaty provides a
   specific mechanism enabling differences between national laws which are
   `distorting the conditions of competition in the common market' and
   where `the resultant distortion needs to be eliminated' to be
   addressed, if necessary by Community legislation, following
   consultations with the Member States concerned, by the Commission and
   the Council. ( [41]40 )

   37.

   In many cases in which the Court has been asked to assess State
   measures, affecting competitive conditions on the relevant national
   markets, the Court has rejected suggestions that the Member States
   concerned have violated the principle of effet utile of Articles 85 and
   86 of the Treaty. The Court has, therefore, refused to invoke the
   Treaty as a guarantor of unimpeded free trade, thus circumscribing the
   Member States' prerogatives to decide to pursue alternative economic
   policies. ( [42]41 ) The pertinent case-law has been so fully reviewed
   in the Opinions of Advocates General Darmon and Tesauro, to which I
   have referred, that repetition by me would serve no useful purpose.

   38.

   The national measures which have survived this scrutiny include control
   of retail prices of tobacco products, ( [43]42 ) petrol, ( [44]43 ) and
   books, ( [45]44 ) regulation of bank deposit interest rates, ( [46]45 )
   a legislative restraint on the grant of financial incentives by
   insurance intermediaries, ( [47]46 ) and the regulation of road haulage
   rates, ( [48]47 ) all of them in some degree interferences with the
   free play of competition.

   39.

   To employ the analogy cited by Advocate General Darmon in his Opinion
   in Reiff, it is one thing for economic operators to come together and
   agree on opening hours (thus removing competition inter se in that
   sphere), but quite a different matter for Member States to regulate
   such hours in the public interest. ( [49]48 ) It is not the effects of
   the impugned measure which are therefore crucial but, rather, the means
   by which those effects are brought about.

   40.

   I would emphasize that it is not for the Court to impose its own
   conception of legitimate (national) public interests and `in some
   degree become a legislator' in areas of domestic social, economic or
   monetary policy. ( [50]49 ) That is not to say that the Member States
   have complete autonomy to impose on their domestic markets all manner
   of restrictions on competition but, rather, to recognize that, as is
   clear from the case-law of the Court concerning national laws
   undermining the effectiveness of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,
   Member States may regulate domestic economic affairs while respecting
   the rights of individuals flowing from the direct effect of Treaty
   provisions.

   E -- Consideration of the second question

   41.

   Through its second question, the national court raises a more specific
   issue regarding national laws claimed to undermine, in the light of
   what has been called the doctrine of effet utile, the application of
   Treaty provisions on competition. In essence, I have to consider
   whether private economic operators are accorded such a decisive role in
   the implementation of the Law as to deprive it of its official
   character. The relevant case-law can again be traced in the Opinions of
   Advocates General Tesauro and Darmon in the Meng, Reiff and Ohra
   trilogy of cases. ( [51]50 ) I am heavily indebted to those Opinions
   and I believe the task of the Court in the present case is to apply the
   principles of Community law so clearly delineated there and adopted by
   the Court in its judgments in the three cases.

   42.

   In each of those rulings ( [52]51 ) the Court referred to the
   exposition outlined in its earlier decision in Van Eycke, ( [53]52 )
   which reads as follows:

   `Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty per se are concerned only with the
   conduct of undertakings and not with national legislation. The Court
   has consistently held, however, that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,
   in conjunction with Article 5, require the Member States not to
   introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative nature,
   which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to
   undertakings. Such would be the case, the Court has held, if a Member
   State were to require or favour the adoption of agreements or concerted
   practices contrary to Article 85 or to reinforce their effects, or to
   deprive its own legislation of its official character by delegating to
   private traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the
   economic sphere.'

   43.

   The classification in the second sentence need not be exhaustive. The
   Court, through the use of the formulation, `such would be the case',
   has left open the possibility that other categories of national
   measures might equally render ineffective the competition rules
   applicable to undertakings. An obvious example would be an allegation,
   such as that referred to by both the national court and the applicant
   in this case, where, by sustaining and facilitating the abuse of a
   collective dominant position, a national measure has impaired the
   effectiveness of Article 86 of the Treaty. ( [54]53 ) It may be that
   further categories also exist, particularly within the framework of the
   Member States' obligation not to weaken the application of Article 85
   to undertakings. However, in my opinion, the allegations advanced by
   the applicants in these cases can be considered exclusively by
   reference to the existing classification.

   (i) Effect on trade between Member States

   44.

   Before addressing the issue whether the Law can be properly regarded as
   falling foul of any of the existing categories, it is necessary to
   determine whether it can be regarded as having the requisite effect on
   inter-State trade. For, just as it would be illogical for the Court to
   apply Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty to State measures in the absence
   of any connection with the conduct of undertakings, it would be more so
   to give those articles a wider scope in the case of State action than
   would be required in the case of conduct of undertakings. It follows,
   therefore, that it is only if the impugned State measure has a
   potentially appreciable effect on trade between Member States, that it
   is necessary to examine the extent to which it interferes adversely
   with the effectiveness of the competition rules applicable to
   undertakings.

   45.

   The Court has consistendy held that it is not essential for an
   agreement to have an actual effect on trade between Member States, once
   it can be demonstrated that it has at least the potential to affect
   such trade. ( [55]54 ) In a number of decisions affecting the
   distribution sector, the Court has confirmed that even attempts to
   regulate the distribution of products within a single Member State are
   capable potentially of affecting inter-State trade. As the Court ruled
   in Papiers Peints v Commission, which concerned an agreement between
   four of the five wallpaper manufacturers in Belgium, `the fact that a
   price fixing arrangement ... only covers the marketing of products in a
   single Member State does not rule out the possibility that trade
   between Member States may be affected', because, `a restrictive
   agreement extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State
   is by its nature hable to have the effect of reinforcing the
   compartmentalization of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up
   the economic interpénétration which the Treaty is designed to bring
   about'. ( [56]55 )

   46.

   The applicants submit that the planning system enables existing traders
   to use the Law as a means of isolating the retail trade in Italy from
   outside competition. At the oral hearing they claimed that the Italian
   market is effectively foreclosed. In other words, any new entrant to
   the market has to find a development plan where the full quota of
   licences has not been issued and then seek to persuade the local
   authorities to grant a licence. They refer to the Opinion of Advocate
   General Jacobs in Batista Morais in support of their submission that
   even a situation which would, for the purposes of the freedom of
   movement of persons as provided by the Treaty, be regarded as purely
   internal, may, none the less, be regarded as capable of precluding
   access to the affected market for new national and non-national
   competitors, and thus capable of affecting trade between Member States
   for the purposes of Article 85 of the Treaty. ( [57]56 )

   47.

   The Batista Morais case, cited by the applicants, does not assist them
   to establish that the operation of the Law here potentially forecloses
   the Italian retail market from new competition and can, thus, be
   regarded as having an adverse effect on competition in inter-State
   trade. That case concerned a Portuguese decree-law which prevented
   driving schools from operating outside the municipalities in which they
   were established. The effect of the territorial requirement was that
   driving lessons could not be given outside the assigned geographical
   area. Mr Morais, a driving instructor from a Lisbon school, was
   prosecuted for giving a lesson on a motorway located in an adjoining
   municipality. ( [58]57 ) In rejecting the allegation that such a
   measure could be challenged by reference to Article 85(1) of the Treaty
   the Court ruled that:

   `[Without the need] to examine whether, and to what extent, legislation
   of the type at issue in the main proceedings encourages, renders
   obligatory or renders unavoidable any one of the business practices
   referred to in Article 85 of the Treaty, it is sufficient to note that
   the provision can only be applied to the extent to which [the]
   allegedly anticompetitive practices may affect trade between Member
   States.

   That condition would be satisfied only if it could be established that
   the national legislation, operating in a like manner to a network of
   agreements made in a reference market, would have the effect of denying
   access to that market to new national and foreign competitors (see the
   judgment in Case [59]C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG [1991] ECR
   I-935). However, national legislation of the type at issue in the main
   proceedings is not capable of having such an effect.' ( [60]58 )

   48.

   According to the applicants, the Lawfavours and reinforces
   anticompetitive practices between existing traders, which is the
   mechanism through which the Italian retail market is said to be
   foreclosed. In other words, they say, there is a network of agreements
   in practice, actual or potential, which leads to that result. Such a
   contention requires to be submitted to the Delimitis analysis. The
   requisite effect on intra-Community trade and, more generally, on
   competition could be shown by linking it with concerted behaviour or
   other anticompetitive conduct on the part of existing traders or their
   representatives at municipal level in Italy, which itself forms part of
   a network or pattern of similar conduct carried out across the entire
   Member State and which, cumulatively, has the effect of foreclosing the
   Italian market. ( [61]59 ) By undertaking such an analysis and applying
   it, mutatis mutandis, to assess the foreclosing effects of the impugned
   national law, one would be in a position to determine whether it
   operates as, and not merely `in a like manner' to, a network of private
   agreements. While the applicants have forcefully stressed what they
   perceive to be the self-evidently concerted nature of the activities
   and common purpose of the distributor and retail representatives on
   these advisory committees which operate across Italy, they have not
   referred to any evidence which would be sufficient to justify a
   conclusion that, as a result of the application of the Law, such a
   network of collusion either subsists or has been encouraged in Italy.

   49.

   It must be emphasized that, if it were established that, whether or not
   under the operation of the Law, existing traders were engaging in
   anticompetitive conduct for the purpose of foreclosing to an
   appreciable extent the Italian retail market from potential
   competition, such conduct could be challenged directly before Italian
   courts by virtue of the direct effect of Article 85 of the Treaty. In
   other words, if the applicants' contentions regarding the existence of
   anticompetitive concerted behaviour by undertakings on the Italian
   market can be proved, those undertakings are directly amenable to the
   national court for infringement of the Treaty. ( [62]60 ) Consequently,
   there would be no question of the Treaty articles being deprived of
   their effet utile by the existence of Law No 426. The applicants are
   not deprived of their remedy if they can prove what they allege.

   50.

   In order to establish the existence of such a network with partitioning
   effect, careful regard ought to be paid to the criteria set out in the
   Delimitis case. ( [63]61 ) The Delimitis test is not a mechanical one,
   but one which requires the national court to engage in a dynamic
   economic and legal analysis in which it should determine the extent, if
   any, of the collusion, the relevant product and geographical markets,
   the market shares of the parties involved, the alternative means of
   access to the relevant market for potential competitors and the
   cumulative effect of such behaviour across Italy on the overall
   accessibility of the market. Such an analysis is at present completely
   absent, but, in the context of a preliminary reference under Article
   177 of the Treaty, it is for the referring court to make all necessary
   findings of fact.

   (ii) Infringement of Article 85 of the Treaty

   51.

   The question of the compatibility of the Law with Article 85 of the
   Treaty would arise if the Court were to conclude that the effects of
   the Law do not only operate on a purely local, municipality by
   municipality, basis but, rather, protect the entire national market
   from effective competition. Does the Law favour the adoption of
   anticompetitive conduct on the part of undertakings or does it
   reinforce the effects of any such existing activities?

   52.

   The applicants' case in this respect is based (like their allegations
   concerning the existence of an abuse of a dominant position contrary to
   Article 86 of the Treaty) largely on the presumed existence of the
   impugned behaviour. As the Commission rightly points out in its written
   and oral observations, no attempt has been made to establish the
   existence of any agreement or concerted action on the part of existing
   Italian traders, designed to avail of the position of influence
   afforded to them by the operation at communal level of the Law, in
   order to further the protection of their own commercial positions on
   the relevant retail markets. Nothing of probative value emerges from
   the written or oral procedure to indicate that the representatives of
   existing traders on the advisory committees have, as result of the
   operation of the Law, been enabled to enforce existing or potential
   agreements, or concerted practices, so as to resist, through systematic
   efforts, applications from potential competitors.

   53.

   In my opinion the Court may not presuppose the existence of such
   agreements. While it is true that the Court has never required proof of
   the existence of a perfect or fully-elaborated agreement, attributable
   to a State measure, when applying Article 5 in conjunction with
   Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, it is equally clear that a presumed
   predisposition on the part of retailers to act in a certain manner,
   without any direct or indirect evidence of concerted contact or
   coordination of behaviour, cannot in itself justify the conclusion that
   the Law allowed those retailers to develop or extend in a concerted
   fashion their mutual efforts across Italy. ( [64]62 ) It is not,
   indeed, self-evident that all traders will see their interests as being
   best served by rigid exclusion of newcomers from the market. At least
   some will own chains of shops and may wish to extend them. Even this
   point is speculative. The real point is that, in the absence of
   evidence, the Court should not speculate.

   54.

   The applicants also submit that the Law cannot, in reality, be
   considered as constituting a genuine public measure for the purpose of
   the application of Article 85 of the Treaty. While the national court
   in its orders for reference queries the legitimacy of representatives
   of the distribution and retail trade being permitted to influence
   competition in that trade, the Commission, having regard to the
   case-law culminating in Reiff, confirmed subsequently in the Delta
   Schiffahrts-und Speditionsgesellschaft case, ( [65]63 ) rightly
   emphasized the minority position prescribed for the representatives of
   such traders, the merely advisory role of traders in appointments to
   the smaller committees, the legal requirement constraining the
   committees (and the mayor as the deciding authority) to render their
   opinions in accordance with the public interest criteria set out in
   Articles 11 and 12 of the Law, and, above all, the nonbinding nature of
   the opinions of the committee except where there is no development
   plan.

   55.

   There can be no doubt that the circumstances of modern governance,
   where decision-making has become so complex and technical, argue
   strongly in favour of the consultation of parties likely directly to be
   affected. ( [66]64 ) However, the case-law of the Court clearly
   establishes that it is the relevant legislative, governmental or public
   authority (depending on the case) which must make the actual decision
   which affects competition in accordance with the public interest. In
   the context of preliminary references, where the Court will often not
   be in possession of all the relevant information, it is the national
   court which must assess both the legitimacy and the de facto
   application of public objectives advanced in support of impugned
   national rules. ( [67]65 )

   56.

   Judicial review at national level is the proper means of ensuring that
   the proclaimed purposes of national laws are not undermined by those
   responsible for their administration. While criticisms have been
   advanced, particularly at the oral hearing, of the efficacy of the
   Italian system of judicial review of administrative action, these
   relate to matters which are not within the proper competence of this
   Court when answering preliminary questions. In any event, it was
   acknowledged that an Italian court has power to review a refusal to
   issue a licence and to remit the matter to the administrative
   authorities with instructions to reconsider it, all of which I would
   regard as a perfectly normal judicial function. The criticism is that
   the judge, faced with a negative decision, i. e. a refusal, has no
   power to order its suspension and replacement by a positive act.
   Although, I repeat, these are essentially matters for the national
   court, none of these considerations suggests that the Italian courts
   are powerless to deal with the alleged deep-rooted subversion of the
   public interest objectives of the law.

   57.

   While it may not always be possible clearly to define or determine
   where acceptable lobbying ends and where unlawful delegation of public
   responsibilities begins, or indeed entirely to separate public from
   private interests (there may quite often be a substantial overlap), the
   Court has through its case-law developed a number of criteria which can
   be of considerable assistance to national courts in making that vital
   assessment on a case by case basis.

   58.

   Even where it can be established that representatives of private
   interests exercise their powers, largely or exclusively, in order to
   advance the interests of their private sector masters, one cannot
   necessarily conclude that the Member State concerned has abdicated its
   public legislative function to private interests. One must also
   carefully examine whether the decision-making body, regardless of its
   formal structure, is obliged to exercise its powers in accordance with
   public interest objectives. Thus, while the Court adopted a rather
   formal approach to assessing the likely concerns of the various
   industry representatives on the tariff commissions at the centre of the
   disputes in the Reiff and Delta cases, this approach must be seen in
   the context of the extensive scheme of checks and balances built into
   the German system. ( [68]66 )

   59.

   Detailed public interest criteria were set out in the relevant German
   legislation for the purpose of pursuing a stated public interest
   objective (balancing competitive conditions on the various transport
   sectors with a view to promoting rail and waterway transport), the
   relevant minister was obliged to ensure that these criteria were
   respected by the tariff commissions when approving their proposals and
   the administrative courts had the ultimate responsibility of ensuring
   that the tariff commissions did not become a breeding ground for the
   pursuit of the interests of private cartels. This contrasted rather
   sharply with the earlier French cases involving the cognac industry,
   where the national legislation merely provided a forum which brought
   together the representatives of the various branches of the industry
   within a legal framework established by the State. Those
   representatives were then in a position to determine fundamental
   commercial matters, which included conditions of supply and payment,
   marketing rules and prices, secure in the knowledge that the relevant
   minister would (and did in the instant cases), on request, make the
   agreement legally binding on every economic operator engaged in the
   market. ( [69]67 )

   60.

   Upon consideration of the national court's enumeration of the public
   interest criteria underpinning the Law (see paragraph 4 above), I
   cannot avoid noting the general and somewhat vague manner in which they
   appear to be formulated in the Law. Ambiguity can be the enemy of
   proper public control. The applicants have, moreover, strongly
   contended that the real effect of the Law is to accord to private
   undertakings, already present on retail markets across Italy (despite
   their apparent minority position on both types of committee and the
   decisionmaking role formally envisaged for the major), a decisive
   influence on the grant or refusal of trading licence applications by
   potential competitors. It is not for this Court, in the context of a
   preliminary reference, ultimately to determine either issues proper for
   consideration by the national court or disputed factual issues. None
   the less, on the basis of the evidence actually before the Court, it
   cannot be said that Italy has, through the Law, unlawfully delegated
   its public regulatory powers to the trade representatives on the
   committees established pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of the Law in
   frustration of Article 85 of the Treaty.

   (iii) Remaining issnes

   a. Article 86 of the Treaty

   61.

   As I have already mentioned, the compatibility of the Law with Article
   86 of the Treaty was raised by the national court in the grounds
   supporting its first question and (briefly) by the applicants in their
   written submissions. Does this Law facilitate the creation of a
   collective dominant position between existing retailers and does it
   permit them to abuse that position by enabling them to impose selling
   prices which they could not have imposed had there been more effective
   competition on the market? I find myself fully in agreement with the
   observations made by the Commission in this respect.

   62.

   The Commission observes that a collective dominant position by the
   undertakings which already have trading licences presupposes that there
   is already no or limited competition among those undertakings. However,
   the legislative imposition of limits on the total number of shops does
   not restrict competition between those shops which already exist. In
   any event, as the present cases concern restrictions on competition
   within communes, the Commission also contended that the Law could not
   lead to the establishment of a dominant position in a substantial part
   of the common market as required for the application of Article 86 of
   the Treaty.

   63.

   It appears to me that, before even considering whether a commune or
   group of communes could constitute a substantial part of the common
   market for the purposes of applying Article 86 of the Treaty, some
   attempt should be made, but none has been by the applicants, to define
   the relevant product market. Thus, the distribution and retail
   committee representatives in different communes, having an opportunity
   to influence the outcome of licence applications, might not necessarily
   represent similar trading concerns. In other words, I would have grave
   reservations as to whether it can necessarily be said, for example,
   that jewellery (Case C-140/94) and hardware products for domestic use
   (Case C-141/94) are sufficiently interchangeable to constitute a
   uniform, relevant product market, or that the representatives of those
   sectors are necessarily going to have similar views on Ucence
   applications. As the Court has ruled, the `possibilities of competition
   can only be judged in relation to those characteristics of the products
   in question by virtue of which those products are particularly apt to
   satisfy an inelastic need, and are only to a limited extent
   interchangeable with other products'. ( [70]68 ) In the absence of any
   detailed information about the product markets affected by the Law, it
   would seem to me to be impossible to maintain that any abuse of a
   dominant position, collective or otherwise, arises for consideration in
   this reference.

   64.

   The concept of collective dominance cannot be used to substitute for
   the lack of any direct evidence of the existence, and still less of any
   abuse, of a dominant position (namely by an individual undertaking
   already present in some or all of the 8000 affected communes). The
   Court of First Instance stated in the Società Italiano Vetro & Ors v
   Commission case that:

   `There is nothing, in principle, to prevent two or more economic
   entities from being, on a specific market, united by such economic
   links that, by virtue of that fact, together they hold a dominant
   position vis-à-vis the other operators on the same market. This could
   be the case, for example, where two or more independent undertakings
   jointly have, through agreements or licences, a technological lead
   affording them the power to behave to an appreciable extent
   independently of their competitors, their customers and ultimately
   their consumers.' ( [71]69 )

   65.

   Leaving aside the dispersed nature of the markets at issue in these
   cases, there is nothing in the orders for reference or the submissions
   before the Court which suggests that some or all of the existing
   traders act, or possess distinctive commercial features, on their
   respective markets which in any way, with respect any to their
   suppliers, competitors or customers, enable them effectively to behave
   as a single economic unit. As the Court of First Instance also rightly
   pointed out in the same judgment, an abuse of a collectively dominant
   position cannot be established simply by recycling what is essentially,
   if anything at all, an Article 85 concerted practice case. I would,
   therefore, conclude that the tentative reference to the possibility
   that such an abuse may have been facilitated by the operation of the
   Law in this case ought to be rejected.

   b. Article 30 of the Treaty

   66.

   In the LIDL reference (Case C-141/94) the compatibility of the Law with
   Article 30 of the Treaty is raised. Unlike Articles 85 and 86 of the
   Treaty which are addressed to undertakings, Article 30 is addressed to
   Member States and may be relied upon to attack the compatibility with
   that article of a national law before national courts.

   67.

   The only reason advanced by the national court for referring to Article
   30 of the Treaty is that the LIDL undertaking is a subsidiary of a
   German company. During the oral hearing the applicants submitted that,
   because the Law operated effectively to exclude new entrants, many of
   whom would be non-Italian operators desirous of establishing
   large-scale and sometimes discount outlets which might sell more
   non-Italian goods than existing traders, it was likely, either actually
   or at least potentially, to hinder intra-Community trade.

   68.

   I believe that this argument must be rejected. As the Commission righdy
   observes, while the Law limits the overall number of trading licences,
   it does not necessarily produce an overall decrease in the number or
   value of goods sold on the Italian market nor does it necessarily
   render more difficult the sale of imports as opposed to domestic
   goods. ( [72]70 ) I accept the Commission's observation that this type
   of provision is not capable of hindering intra-Community trade and,
   thus, falls outside the prima facie scope of Article 30 of the
   Treaty. ( [73]71 )

   69.

   In my opinion, it is necessary to examine whether the Law ought to be
   regarded as a `selling arrangement' within the meaning of the principle
   established in Keck and Mithouard, ( [74]72 ) or whether it must be
   assessed by reference to the approach formulated in the Dassonville and
   Cassis de Dijon cases. ( [75]73 ) The Court has confirmed in recent
   decisions its tendency not to interpret the concept of a selling
   arrangement narrowly. Thus, it concluded in its ruling in
   Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité and M6 Publicité that a French provision
   precluding the distribution sector from advertising on television was a
   selling arrangement `since it prohibits a particular form of promotion
   (televised advertising) of a particular method of marketing products
   (distribution)'. ( [76]74 )

   70.

   I do not find the Commission's distinction between a restraint on
   selling arrangements per se and a restraint on the opening of a shop,
   in the first place, to be convincing. It seems to me that this
   constitutes a distinction without a real difference and masks the real
   distinction which, according to the Keck and Mithouard judgment itself,
   must be made in these cases; namely that between rules which regulate
   selling (though in a nondiscriminatory way) and those which impose
   substantive conditions by reference to the product, such as dimension,
   ingredients, labelling or other peripheral characteristics.

   71.

   If the national law were to provide that new retail traders could open
   as many new outlets (over and above the figure specified in the
   relevant plan) as they wished, but simultaneously imposed severely
   limited trading hours, such a law would surely be classified as a
   `selling arrangement' (the regulation of opening hours must be one of
   the most obvious forms of national selling arrangements), yet it could
   operate to exclude new traders as effectively as the law at issue in
   the instant cases. Thus, in my opinion, this Law, if it is to be
   regarded as being subject to scrutiny under Article 30 of the Treaty at
   all, ought to be classified as a `selling arrangement'. Moreover, on
   applying the Keck and Mithouard principle, it would also not appear to
   pose any difficulty from the perspective of Article 30, since it
   contains no form of discrimination, in law or in fact, against goods
   imported from other Member States.

   Conclusion

   72.

   Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the questions referred by the
   Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto should be answered as
   follows:

   (1)

   legislation providing for a planning forecast for the commercial
   network incorporating predetermined lists of goods subject to quotas,
   thus precluding the opening of new shops when the market is deemed, in
   accordance with the plan, to be adequately served, is not in itself
   contrary to either Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty;

   (2)

   legislation requiring an opinion to be obtained from a collective body,
   whose members include representatives of traders already operating on
   the market, both when the plan is drawn up and when new licences are
   granted, is not contrary to either Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty;

   (3)

   such legislation is not capable of hindering intra-Community trade for
   the purposes of the application of Article 30 of the Treaty so long as,
   in law or in fact, it does not distinguish between imports and domestic
   products.
     __________________________________________________________________

   ( [77]*1 ) Original language: English.

   ( [78]1 ) Official Journal of the Italian Republic No 168 of 6 July
   1971.

   ( [79]2 ) Ibid., p. 9.

   ( [80]3 ) At the oral hearing the applicants stated that these are
   trading organizations.

   ( [81]4 ) Official Journal of the Italian Republic, Ordinary
   Supplement, General Series No 141 of 18 April 1994.

   ( [82]5 ) The two most notable amendments in so far as the system for
   obtaining trade licences is concerned are as follows: (i) if the public
   authorities do not respond to a licence application within 90 days, the
   licence is deemed to be granted; (ii) the mayor is no longer obliged to
   obtain the opinion of the committee prior to granting a licence.

   ( [83]6 ) It was confirmed during the oral hearing that Bassano del
   Grappa is a commune comprising less than 50000 inhabitants.

   ( [84]7 ) It appears that this list includes foodstuffs and other
   products of general consumption normally sold in supermarkets.

   ( [85]8 ) See paragraph 4 above.

   ( [86]9 ) Some emphasis was placed at the oral hearing on the
   restrictive effects of the operation of the Law on the ability of new
   retailers, many of whom might be subsidiaries of non-Italian
   undertakings, to enter the Italian market. However, the compatibility
   of any such restrictions with Article 52, or possibly Article 59, of
   the Treaty was not raised by the Italian court and, therefore, as in
   proceedings under Article 177 of the Treaty, `it is for the national
   court alone to assess the relevance of such arguments and to make a
   fresh reference if it considers that it is necessary to obtain a
   further ruling on the interpretation of Community law for the purpose
   of giving its judgment' (see, e. g., Case [87]311/84 CBEM v C LT and
   IPB [19851 ECR 3261, paragraph 10 of the judgment), it does not arise
   for consideration in this case.

   ( [88]10 ) Case [89]C-2/91 [1993] ECR I-5751.

   ( [90]11 ) Case [91]C-185/91 [1993] ECR I-5801.

   ( [92]12 ) Case [93]C-245/91 [1993] ECR I-5851.

   ( [94]13 ) A figure of some 8000 communes was mentioned at the oral
   hearing.

   ( [95]14 ) Case [96]C-60/91 [1992] ECR I-2085.

   ( [97]15 ) At the oral hearing it was suggested that this resulted
   largely from the fact that the committee is regarded as performing a
   public function and that, therefore, a mayor would be slow to disregard
   its opinion. Reference was made to a very recent letter from the
   secretary-general of the town of Chioggia staring that, in his 30 years
   working for that municipality, the municipal authorities had never
   departed from the opinion of the committee. It was not stated, however,
   that the opinions of the Chioggia committee were in all cases adverse
   to applications for trade licences.

   ( [98]16 ) Reference is made to Case [99]267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA [1988]
   ECR 4769, paragraph 16 of the judgment.

   ( [100]17 ) Although not mentioned in the applicants' written
   submissions, reference was made at the oral hearing to a number of
   procedural factors which allegedly have the effect of reinforcing the
   substantive control by existing traders of these committees despite
   what is, formally, their minority position as set out in Articles 15
   and 16 of the Law.

   ( [101]18 ) Cited in notes 10 to 12 above.

   ( [102]19 ) See Reiff, cited in note 11, paragraph 14 of the judgment.

   ( [103]20 ) The Commission stated at the hearing that the Law was
   clearly against the principle of free competition, but that this was
   not sufficiënt to bring it into conflict with the Treaty.

   ( [104]21 ) Joined Cases [105]C-267 & C-268/9I [1993] ECR I-6D97.

   ( [106]22 ) Case [107]C-379/92 [1994] ECR I-3453.

   ( [108]23 ) Sec, e. g., Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on
   the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on
   the environment, [109]OJ 1985 L 175, p. 40.

   ( [110]24 ) See the introduction to the Commission's DC Annual Report
   on Competition Policy, p. 10.

   ( [111]25 ) See, e. g., Case [112]137/84 Ministère Public v Mutsch
   [1985] ECR 2681, paragraph 6 of the judgment.

   ( [113]26 ) DC Annual Report on Competition Policy, Introduction p. 9.

   ( [114]27 ) Case [115]6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v
   Commission [1973] ECR 215, p. 244.

   ( [116]28 ) The extensive nature of this obligation is illustrated by
   the broad scope of the enforcement action procedures set out, inter
   alia, in Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty, by the general terms of
   Article 5 of the Treaty and by the very nature of the Community as one
   which is based on the rule of law.

   ( [117]29 ) See, e. g., Case [118]229/83 Leclerc v Au Blé Vert [1985]
   ECR 1 and Case [119]231/83 Cullet v Leclerc [1985] ECR 305.

   ( [120]30 ) See the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case 229/83,
   loc. cit., paragraph 8.

   ( [121]31 ) Case [122]13/77 [1977] ECR 2115.

   ( [123]32 ) Cited in notes 10 ct 12.

   ( [124]33 ) See, e. g. Verstrynge, J. `The Obligations of Member States
   as Regards Competition in the EEC Treaty' (1988) Fordham Corp. Law
   Institute 17-1; Gyselen, L. `State Action and the Effectiveness of the
   EEC Treaty's Competition Provisions' (1989) 26 CMLRev 33 and a more
   recent post Mens, Aeglf and Ohra discussion in Chan-Mo, C. `The
   Relationship between State Regulation and EC Competition Law: Two
   Proposals for a Coherent Approach' (1995) 2 ECLR 87.

   ( [125]34 ) See paragraph 14 of the judgment in Meng and Reiff and
   paragraph 11 in Ohra, cited in notes 10 to 12.

   ( [126]35 ) See Advocate General Tesauro's Opinion, paragraph 25.

   ( [127]36 ) See the Opinion of Advocate General Slynn in Case
   [128]355/85 Driancourt v Cogner [1986] ECR3231, p. 3236 where he stated
   that it was `plain that Article 3(f) of the Treaty cannot and does not
   have direct effect in itself. It only operates through the substantive
   provisions on competition such as those in Article 85'.

   ( [129]37 ) See Case [130]78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro [1971] ECR
   487, paragraph 5 of the judgment.

   ( [131]38 ) Sec Case [132]C-234/89 Delimais v Henninger Bräu AC [1991]
   ECR I-935, paragraphs 5 and 10 of the Opinion.

   ( [133]39 ) Advocate General Tesauro points out in his joined Opinion
   in Meng and Ohra (see paragraph 30) that the cases requiring the
   application of Amele 85 of the Treaty directly to Assess the validity
   of anticompetitive State measures should be purely residual, because
   the majority of such measures would be, in any case, incompatible with
   Articles 30 or 59.

   ( [134]40 ) Article 102 of the Treaty furnishes a not dissimilar
   procedure in relation to the proposed adoption (or amendment) by Member
   States of measures which may potentially distort competitive
   conditions.

   ( [135]41 ) See Marenco, G. `Le traité CEE interdit-il aux Etats
   Membres de restreindre la concurrence?' (1984) 20 RTDE 527.

   ( [136]42 ) Joined Cases [137]177 and 178/82 Van de Haar [1984] ECR
   1797.

   ( [138]43 ) Case 231/83 Cullet v Ledere, cited in note 29.

   ( [139]44 ) Case 229/83 Leclerc v Au Blé Ven, cited in note 29.

   ( [140]45 ) Case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA, cited in note 16.

   ( [141]46 ) See Meng, cited in note 10.

   ( [142]47 ) See Reiff, cited in note 11.

   ( [143]48 ) Paragraph 38 of the Opinion.

   ( [144]49 ) Ibid., the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, paragraph
   73.

   ( [145]50 ) Cited in notes 10 to 12.

   ( [146]51 ) See paragraph 14 of the judgment in Meng and Äetllf
   respectively and paragraph 11 in Ohra.

   ( [147]52 ) Cited in note 16, paragraph 16 of the judgment.

   ( [148]53 ) This allegation, though hardly sustainable on the facts as
   they appear from the orders for reference and not relied upon by the
   applicants at the oral hearing, is discussed briefly infra, paragraphs
   61 to 65.

   ( [149]54 ) See Joined Cases [150]56 and 58/64 Consten & Grundig v
   Commission [1966] ECR 299.

   ( [151]55 ) Case [152]73/74 [1975] ECR 1491, paragraphs 25 and 26 of
   the judgment See also Case [153]126/80 Salonia v Poidomam and Giglio
   [1981] ECR 1563, which concerned a dispute arising in Sicily regarding
   refusal to supply certain newspapers, stationery and books to a
   retailer by a local wholesaler because the retailer was not on the
   Italian publishers' association approved list of retailers, where the
   Court ruled that the mere fact that an agreement was confined to
   national products did not prevent it from being regarded as having
   potentially detrimental repercussions on other non-national products.

   ( [154]56 ) Case C-60/91, cited in note 14.

   ( [155]57 ) In effect, the requirement placed driving schools located
   in municipalities where there were no motorways at a commercial
   disadvantage.

   ( [156]58 ) Loc. cit. supra note 56, paragraphs 12 and 13 of the
   judgment. The Court was not obliged in Batista Morais to give any
   indication of how the Delimitis test ought to be applied to a
   restrictive system created by a nationallaw, as opposed to a private
   network of agreements between undertakings. It is also important to
   note that the Delimitis test was developed in order to furnish criteria
   for determining whether an agreement, in that case an exclusive
   purchasing agreement, which does not have as its object the restriction
   of competition, may nevertheless `have the effect of preventing,
   restricting or distorting competition' (Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG,
   paragraph 13, emphasis added).

   ( [157]59 ) It is noteworthy that Advocate General Jacobs in his
   Opinion in Batista Morais, cited in note 14, while expressing his view
   that the Portuguese decree `appears to be anticompetitive, and no
   convincing reason for it has been advanced' (see paragraph 8), found no
   evidence of any connection between the measure and anticompetitive
   behaviour by Portuguese driving schools.

   ( [158]60 ) Such privately operated cartels could also be the
   subjectmatter of a complaint direcdy to the Commission under Regulation
   No 17. The Commission has recendy confirmed its view that an
   undertaking cannot escape the application of Article 85 simply because
   its behaviour has been encouraged by public authorities. The Commission
   also stated that, even if the State could be rendered hable, this would
   at most serve to reduce the amount of a fine to which the undertaking
   might be hable, but would not exclude the application of the
   competition rules to it {see Commission Decision 95/188/EC of 30
   January 1995 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC
   Treaty, Coapi, [159]OJ 1995 L 122, p. 37, paragraphs 44 to 48).

   ( [160]61 ) Loc. cit.

   ( [161]62 ) See paragraph 99 of Advocate General Darmon's Opinion in
   Reiff, cited in note 11, where he states that the Court does not
   require, for the combined application of Articles 3(f), 5 and 85, proof
   of a perfect cartel. A State measure must be shown to be linked with
   some form of cartel-like activities by, or on the part of undertakings,
   in order for it to be subject to scrutiny under Articles 5 and 85 of
   the Treaty.

   ( [162]63 ) Case [163]C-153/93 [1994] ECR I-2517.

   ( [164]64 ) In relation to the decision-making process established by
   the Community Treaties, it may be said that a similar principle is now
   expressed in the Treaty on European Union which, in Article A, refers
   to `an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which
   decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen'.

   ( [165]65 ) In this regard I would draw attention to the note of
   caution expressed by Professor Bach in his case-note on the Reiff, Ohra
   and Meng, (1994) 31 CMLRev 1357, where, at footnote 14, he comments
   that, `instead of presuming corporate rulemaking to be in the public
   interest, however, it seems much more justified to presume that this
   kind of rule follows the economic interests of those participating in
   the rulemaking and creates restrictive conditions for newcomers and
   outsiders'.

   ( [166]66 ) Cited in notes 11 and 63. See the comprehensive discussion
   of these controls in the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon.

   ( [167]67 ) See Case [168]123/83 BNIC v Clair [1985] ECR391 and Case
   [169]136/86 BNIC v Aubert [1987] ECR 4789.

   ( [170]68 ) Sec Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v
   Commission, cited in note 27, paragraph 32 of the judgment.

   ( [171]69 ) Joined Cases [172]T-68, T-77 and T-78/89 [1992] ECR
   II-1403, paragraph 358 of the judgment.

   ( [173]70 ) This might be the case if the Law encouraged existing
   traders to sell, or rendered a successful licence obligation subject to
   a commitment or understanding that the applicant would endeavour to
   sell, as many local or national products as possible. No such
   allegation was advanced in relation to the operation of the Law in
   Italy.

   ( [174]71 ) The Commission refers to the recent Case C-379/92 Matteo
   Peralta, cited in note 22. Mr Peralta argued that the application to
   ships flying the Italian flag of a prohibition of the discharge of
   various substances into the sea, whether within Italian territorial
   waters or on the high seas (the latter provision not being applicable
   to non-Italian ships), effectively increased the costs of transport on
   Italian snips and thus also the costs of importing goods into Italy.
   The Court had little difficulty in rejecting the argument that such a
   measure had potentially restrictive effects on the free movement of
   goods as being `too uncertain and indirect for the obligation which it
   lays down to be regarded as being of such a nature as to hinder trade
   between Member States' (paragraph 24 of the judgment).

   ( [175]72 ) Cited in note 21.

   ( [176]73 ) Case [177]8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR
   837 and [178]120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur
   Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.

   ( [179]74 ) Case C-412/93, judgment of 9 February 1995, not yet
   reported, paragraph 22. See abo the Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas
   in Case [180]C-63/94 Groupement national des négociants en pommes de
   terre de Belgique v SA ITM Belgium and SA Vocarex delivered on 23 March
   1995 in which, y way of extension from the Keck and Mithouard ruling
   itself, the Advocate General expressed the view that a rule which
   prevented the sale of potatoes at an extremely low profit margin also
   constituted a `selling arrangement'. See further the judgment of 29
   June 1995, [1995] ECR I-1621, in Case C-391/92 Commission v Greece
   where the Court held that national legislation which reserves the sale
   of processed milk for infants solely to pharmacies should be regarded
   as constituting a `selling arrangement'.

References

   1. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0001
   2. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0002
   3. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0003
   4. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0004
   5. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0005
   6. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0006
   7. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0007
   8. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0008
   9. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0009
  10. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0010
  11. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0011
  12. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0012
  13. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0013
  14. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0014
  15. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0015
  16. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0016
  17. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0017
  18. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0018
  19. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0019
  20. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0020
  21. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0021
  22. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0022
  23. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0023
  24. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0024
  25. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0025
  26. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0026
  27. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0027
  28. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0028
  29. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0029
  30. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0030
  31. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0031
  32. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0032
  33. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0033
  34. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0034
  35. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0035
  36. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0036
  37. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0037
  38. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0038
  39. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0039
  40. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0040
  41. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0041
  42. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0042
  43. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0043
  44. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0044
  45. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0045
  46. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0046
  47. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0047
  48. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0048
  49. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0049
  50. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0050
  51. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0051
  52. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0052
  53. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0053
  54. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0054
  55. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0055
  56. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0056
  57. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0057
  58. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0058
  59. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61989C?0234&locale=EN
  60. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0059
  61. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0060
  62. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0061
  63. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0062
  64. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0063
  65. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0064
  66. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0065
  67. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0066
  68. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0067
  69. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0068
  70. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0069
  71. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0070
  72. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0071
  73. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0072
  74. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0073
  75. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0074
  76. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0075
  77. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0001
  78. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0002
  79. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0003
  80. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0004
  81. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0005
  82. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0006
  83. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0007
  84. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0008
  85. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0009
  86. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0010
  87. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61984??0311&locale=EN
  88. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0011
  89. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61991C?0002&locale=EN
  90. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0012
  91. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61991C?0185&locale=EN
  92. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0013
  93. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61991C?0245&locale=EN
  94. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0014
  95. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0015
  96. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61991C?0060&locale=EN
  97. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0016
  98. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0017
  99. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61986??0267&locale=EN
 100. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0018
 101. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0019
 102. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0020
 103. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0021
 104. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0022
 105. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61991C?0267&locale=EN
 106. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0023
 107. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61992C?0379&locale=EN
 108. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0024
 109. file:///../../legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=OJ:L:1985:175:TOC
 110. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0025
 111. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0026
 112. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61984??0137&locale=EN
 113. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0027
 114. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0028
 115. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61972??0006&locale=EN
 116. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0029
 117. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0030
 118. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61983??0229&locale=EN
 119. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61983??0231&locale=EN
 120. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0031
 121. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0032
 122. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61977??0013&locale=EN
 123. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0033
 124. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0034
 125. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0035
 126. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0036
 127. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0037
 128. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61985??0355&locale=EN
 129. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0038
 130. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61970??0078&locale=EN
 131. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0039
 132. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61989C?0234&locale=EN
 133. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0040
 134. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0041
 135. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0042
 136. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0043
 137. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61982??0177&locale=EN
 138. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0044
 139. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0045
 140. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0046
 141. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0047
 142. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0048
 143. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0049
 144. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0050
 145. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0051
 146. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0052
 147. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0053
 148. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0054
 149. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0055
 150. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61964??0056&locale=EN
 151. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0056
 152. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61974??0073&locale=EN
 153. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61980??0126&locale=EN
 154. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0057
 155. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0058
 156. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0059
 157. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0060
 158. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0061
 159. file:///../../legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=OJ:L:1995:122:TOC
 160. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0062
 161. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0063
 162. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0064
 163. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61993C?0153&locale=EN
 164. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0065
 165. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0066
 166. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0067
 167. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0068
 168. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61983??0123&locale=EN
 169. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61986??0136&locale=EN
 170. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0069
 171. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0070
 172. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61989T?0068&locale=EN
 173. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0071
 174. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0072
 175. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0073
 176. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0074
 177. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61974??0008&locale=EN
 178. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61978??0120&locale=EN
 179. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXzB6XjI/L105536-9443TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1995ENA.0900325901-E0075
 180. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61994C?0063&locale=EN