OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL REISCHL

   DELIVERED ON 8 JUNE 1982 ( [1]1 )

   Mr President,

   Members of the Court,

   Although there is already a wellestablished body of case-law on the
   question of the extent to which exceptions to the principle of the free
   movement of goods are permitted on the basis of national rights to a
   patent or trade mark, or of national copyright, these are the first
   proceedings for a preliminary ruling in which it is necessary to
   consider the question of the effects of the relevant provisions of the
   EEC Treaty on the exercise, by the proprietor of a national right in a
   design, of the powers vested in him.

   Nano- Kean Gifts BV, a commercial undertaking whose registered office
   is at The Hague, sells amongst other things ladies' handbags imponed
   from Taiwan. On 23 April 1979, it filed the design for the handbag in
   question with the Benelux Designs Office.

   A United States patent design in respect of a corresponding design has
   been in existence since January 1979. The application for it had
   already been filed in March 1977. The inventor is stated to be Mr
   Siegel from Arizona and the assignee to be Amba Marketing Systems Inc.

   At the beginning of 1980, Keurkoop BV, a mail-order company whose
   registered office is at Rotterdam, offered for sale or even by way of
   gift ladies' handbags having the same or virtually the same appearance
   as the abovementioned registered design which were also directly
   imponed from Taiwan into the Netherlands.

   Nancy Kean Gifts applied for and was granted on the basis of its
   exclusive rights under the Eenvormige Benelux-Wet inzake Tekeningen of
   Modellen [Uniform Benelux Law on Designs, hereinafter referred to as
   "the Uniform Benelux Law"], which entered into force on 1 January 1975,
   an interlocutory injunction ondering Keurkoop BV to refrain from
   "manufacturing, importing, selling, offering for sale, exhibiting,
   delivering, using for industrial or commercial purposes or from holding
   in stock for one of those purposes" ladies' handbags of the kind in
   question.

   Keurkoop BV lodged an appeal against that injunction.

   In its judgment of 20 May 1981 which led to this reference for a
   preliminary ruling, the Third Chamber of the Gerechtshof [Regional
   Court of Appeal], The Hague, held in substance, in the light of the
   facts of the case, that Nancy Kean Gifts was not the author of the
   design for the handbag and had not filed the design with the consent
   of, or on the basis of any legal relationship with, the author or any
   person entitled under him for the Benelux area.

   From a legal point of view, the court making the reference has made the
   following findings, in particular in paragraphs 11 and 12 of its
   judgment. Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the meaning and
   purpose of Article 1 et seq. of the Uniform Benelux Law is not to
   "reward" the creative work of the author of the design. Instead, as
   Article 1 of that law makes clear, it is "the altered appearance of a
   product serving a utility purpose which may be protected as a design".
   Accordingly, the law does not require the design to be the expression
   of a creative or anistie achievement. The purpose of that provision is
   to prevent the imitation for a specific period of designs chosen by
   industrial manufacturers and craftsmen. Thus, the industrial propeny
   right under Article 3 (1) of the Uniform Benelux Law arises, in
   principle, upon first registration and irrespective of whether the
   person filing the design is an industrial manufacturer, a craftsman or
   even the author of the design. If registration is effected without the
   consent of the author of the design or of the person who is to be
   regarded as the author under the Uniform Benelux Law, the author alone
   may, by vinue of Article 5(1), within a certain period lay claim to the
   registration or require its cancellation.

   Since the appellant expressed the opinion that the provisions described
   were incompatible with Anieles 3C and 36 of the EEC Treaty and that the
   action for an injunction could not in any event have succeeded if it
   had obtained the handbags in question "elsewhere in the Common Market",
   the Gerechtshof referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under
   Article 177 of the EEC Treaty the following questions:

   "1.

   Is it compatible with the rules contained in the EEC Treaty concerning
   the free movement of goods, in particular with the provisions of
   Article 36 thereof, to give application to the Uniform Benelux Law on
   Designs in so far as the effect of that law is to grant exclusive
   rights in a design, such as referred to in that law and serving an
   object and function described in paragraph 11 of this judgment, to the
   person who was the first to file it with the competent authority, when
   no person other than the person claiming to be the author of the design
   or the person commissioning or employing the author has the opportunity
   to challenge the right of the person filing the design and/or to defeat
   an application for an injunction lodged by that person by relying on
   the fact that the latter is not the author of the design or the person
   commissioning or employing the author?

   2.

   Can the application for an injunction be defeated in so far as it
   concerns products which the defendant has obtained in a country
   belonging to the Common Market other than the country (belonging to the
   Common Market) for which the injunction is sought if no rights of the
   person who filed the design and who seeks the injunction are infringed
   in that other country by the marketing of those products?"

   My opinion on those questions is as follows:

   1.

   The answer to the questions presupposes that the facts on which the
   court making the reference is called upon to give a ruling fall within
   the scope of Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Trear. It is well known that
   the purpose of those provisions is merely to ensure the free movement
   of goods "between Member States". However, the main action is
   characterized precisely by the fact that a Netherlands commercial
   undertaking is exercising the rights to territorial protection which
   are vested in it in respect of products directly imported from a
   nonmember country, namely Taiwan, against another Netherlands
   commercial undertaking which also obtains those products from Taiwan.
   The respondent and the Commission therefore consider on the basis of
   the findings concerning trademark law made by the Court of Justice in
   the EMI Records cases ( [2]2 ), that the exercise of a right in a
   design in order to prevent the sale of products from a nonmember
   country does not impair the free movement of goods between Member
   States.

   The appellant, however, maintains inter alia that the free movement of
   goods between Member States is already impaired by the fact that the
   judgment of the Netherlands Court is enforceable in the other two
   Benelux countries.

   This dispute, which concerns the question of the status of the Benelux
   economic area within the Common Market as well as the problem of the
   recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions in the other Benelux
   countries, need not, however, in my view, be examined in further detail
   in the present case. Instead, the only matter ofimportance is chat the
   questions raised, evidently as a result of the appellant's submissions
   according to which handbags of the same design originating in Taiwan
   could be imported into the Netherlands from other Member Sutes, are
   regarded by the court making the reference as relevant for the purposes
   of its decision. According to the established case-law of the Court of
   Justice, as expressed more recently inter alia in the Damiani
   judgment ( [3]3 ) , it is for the national court alone, in the light of
   the division of jurisdiction under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, to
   assess with full knowledge of the matter before it, the relevance of
   the questions of law raised by the dispute before it and the necessity
   for a preliminary ruling so as to enable it to give judgment, since
   only the court making the reference has a direct knowledge of the facts
   of the case and of the arguments put forward by the parties and will
   have to give judgment in the case. Accordingly, I consider it
   appropriate to answer both questions.

   2.

   The court making the reference has been asked to determine whether the
   operation of the Uniform Benelux Law is compatible with the provisions
   of the EEC Treaty governing the free movement of goods. In order to
   clarify that question an interpretation of the provisions governing the
   free movement of goods, in particular Articles 3C and 36 of the EEC
   Treaty, is sought from the Court. In that regard it must be borne in
   mind that the Court of Justice may give a ruling under Article 177 of
   the EEC Treatv onlv on the interpretation of the Treaty and of act* of
   the institutions ol the Communin or on the validity of such acts, bui
   noi on the interpretation ot 2 provisionn of national law Accordingly,
   the purpose ol the tirsi question raised rn ine court making the
   reference is to ascertain whether Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty are
   to be interpreted as precluding the application of provisions of
   national law which confer on the first applicant for registration an
   exclusive right in a design, without there being any opportunity for
   persons other than the author, the person commissioning or employing
   che author or any person entitled under the author to challenge that
   right on the ground that the applicant is not the actual author of the
   design.

   In answering that question, it is necessary to proceed on the
   assumption that the exercise of an exclusive territorial right
   constitutes in principle an obstacle to the free movement of goods
   between Member States. Accordingly, any provisions of national law the
   application of which leads to the obstruction of trade between the
   Member States are in principle to be regarded as measures having an
   effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of
   Article 30 of the EEC Treaty.

   However, according to Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, the provisions of
   Anieles 30 to 34 do not preclude such prohibitions or restrictions on
   imports which are justified infer alia on grounds of the protection of
   industrial and commercial property.

   (a)

   The first question to arise is whether national rights in designi also
   fall vithm the abovementioned exception. In mv opinion, it is
   necessary, as is emphasized by all those taking part in the
   proceedings, to take as a basis the Coun's existing case-law on the
   relationship between the rules governing the free movement of goods on
   the one hand and national industrial and intellectual property rights
   on the other.

   After initially establishing in a series of decisions -- at first only
   by implication in the Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft case ( [4]4 )
   and finally by way of an unequivocal statement in the GEMA case ( [5]5
   ) -- that reliance on the right to a patent or trade mark may justify
   an exception to the rules governing the free movement of goods, the
   Court has made it clear that Article 36 of the EEC Treaty also applies
   to copyright and consequently to related protected rights. As is
   apparent from the last-mentioned judgment, the Court proceeded from the
   premise that there were no reasonable grounds for distinguishing
   between industrial and commercial property rights on the one hand and
   copyright on the other, as far as the commercial exploitation of such
   rights is concerned.

   However, the distinctive feature of a right in a design is that it can
   be justified by considerations relating to copyright on the one hand
   and by considerations of industrial policy on the other. It is along
   those lines, too, that the form and scheme of national legislation
   relating to rights in a design differ from one country to another. In
   some cases they are modelled on patent law, in others on the law of
   copyright. That question need not be examined in detail at this point
   since, according to the case-law of the Court, both the right to a
   patent and copyright come within the scope of the protection of
   industrial and commercial property within the meaning of Article 36 of
   the EEC Treaty, with the result that a right in a design must also be
   included in that category. In that connection, it should not be
   forgotten that, as is apparent inter alia from Article 3 (1) of the
   Uniform Benelux Law, the Benelux legislature, too, regards an exclusive
   right in a design as an industrial property right within the meaning of
   the Paris Convention of 1883 for the Protection of Industrial Property.
   Article 1 (2) of that convention, which was most recently amended in
   Stockholm in 1967 and to which all the Member States have acceded,
   includes industrial designs amongst the articles to which the
   protection of industrial property extends.

   Furthermore, the fact that the Council also proceeds on the assumption
   that industrial designs must be regarded as industrial property rights
   is apparent, as the Government of the United Kingdom points out, in
   particular from Article 4 (2) (2) (b) of Regulation No 17 of the
   Council of 6 February 1962 (Official Journal, English Special Edition
   1959-1962, p. 87) in which patents, utility models, designs and trade
   marks are listed as subgroups of industrial property rights.

   (b)

   Since, therefore, it is necessary to proceed from the premise that
   conflicts between a right in a design and the principle of the free
   movement of goods within the common market must be also resolved in
   accordance with Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, reference may also be
   made to the hitherto consistent case-law of the Court of Justice
   according to which it follows from the wording, in particular of the
   second sentence, and trom the position oi that article that the EEC
   Treaty does not affect the existence of industrial and commercial
   property rights permitted under the legislation of a Member State,
   although the exercise of those rights may very well be restricted,
   according to the circumstances, by the prohibitions laid down in the
   Treaty. As an exception to one of the fundamental principles of the
   common market, Article 36 permits restrictions on the free movement of
   goods, according to the case-law of the Court, only in so far as such
   restrictions are justified for the protection of the rights which
   constitute the specific subject-matter of the industrial and commercial
   property rights concerned. Therefore in examining the question whether
   a right in a design arising under the Benelux Law may successfully
   displace the principle of the free movement of goods, it is necessary
   to begin by defining the specific subject-matter of that territorial
   property right in order to deduce from it which barriers to trade may
   be permitted under Community law and which may not.

   In that regard, the question also arises whether the specific
   subject-matter of a right in a design is determined, as the appellant
   contends, by reference to a uniform, as it were ideal, model of this
   property right or whether, as the United Kingdom, German and French
   Governments as well as the respondent and the Commission maintain, it
   is necessary, in determining the specific subject-matter of the right
   in a design within the meaning of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, to take
   as a basis each time the relevant national legislation governing rights
   in a design, regard being had to the specific structure and content of
   that legislation.

   In my view, in the light of the meaning and purpose of the exception
   provided for bv Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, the answer to that
   question can only be that as long as the national provisions of the
   individual Member States on the protection of industrial property in
   the Community have not been harmonized, only the legislatures of the
   Member States may determine whether industrial property rights exist. (
   [6]6 ) It also follows that, in principle, it is for the Member States
   alone to determine the degree of protection which they wish to provide
   in respect of industrial and commercial property rights as well as the
   precise form and content to be given to such rights, subject
   nevertheless to compliance with the limits set out by the Treaty.

   In the light of the above considerations, the specific subject-matter
   of a right in a design under the Benelux Law may be defined, as
   suggested by the Commission on the basis of the case-law of the Court,
   as the exclusive right of the proprietor, in practice the person filing
   the design, to market a product of a given industrial design for the
   first time. That description, which does not claim to be exhaustive, of
   the specific subject-matter of a right in a design and which relates to
   the legal proprietor, should moreover, as far as I can see, hold true
   for all rights in a design arising in the Member States and also
   corresponds to the description of the specific subject-matter of the
   right to a patent and to a trade mark hitherto applied by the Court.

   (c)

   However, in view of the structural differences between national design
   rights, the problem of the proprietor and the structure of the right
   can be resolved only by the legislature of each Member State.

   In consequence of the disparities between the objectives pursued in
   relation to the protection of national rights in a design -- the
   purpose of the Uniform Benelux Law is also, as the Court has heard, to
   protect at least industrial manufacturers or craftsmen who wish to
   distinguish their products from those of others by endowing them with a
   distinctive form -- it must be recognized that the proprietor of a
   right in a design may also be a person who has filed the design without
   the author's consent.

   Finally, the rules embodied in the Uniform Benelux Law would not be
   open to challenge even if the view were to be taken that the EEC Treaty
   restricts the power of the Member States to determine the form of
   industrial property rights so as to ensure that the author of the
   design is afforded some degree of protection by the right in the
   design. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as the
   Gerechtshof and the Netherlands Government in particular have pointed
   out, the system of rules embodied in the Uniform Benelux Law serves
   inter alia to provide for legal certainty inasmuch as the right arises
   upon registration. In that regard, in order to simplify matters, the
   question whether the person applying for registration and the author of
   the design are one and the same person was deliberately omitted from
   consideration. In any event, where registration is effected by a third
   party, the author's rights are protected by the fact that he may within
   a certain period lay claim to the registration or demand its
   cancellation.

   If, on the other hand, as the appellant claims, that opportunity were
   also granted to third parties, the result would be that the actual
   author of the design would no longer be able to assert his rights on
   account of the design's lack of novelty and that would constitute a
   serious encroachment bv Community law on the existence of the right
   guaranteed by national law.

   Furthermore, the compatibility of a legislative technique of that kind
   with Community law is also apparent from the fact that corresponding
   rules are provided for in respect of patents by Articles 56 and 57 of
   the Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (No
   76/76/EEC, [7]Official Journal L 17, 26. 1. 1976, p. 1).

   (d)

   As may be inferred from the judgment making the reference, the
   appellant also takes the view that the protection afforded by the
   Uniform Benelux Law to "copying" is incompatible with the principle of
   the free movement of goods.

   As regards that contention too it is necessary to point out in the
   first place that the question whether "copying" qualifies for
   protection must also be regarded as a matter covered by the content of
   legislation relating to rights in a design and is thus subject to the
   system established by the Member States. In this case, too, as the
   Government of the Federal Republic of Germany rightly sutes, it is not
   possible, because of the lack of harmonization of national laws
   governing rights in a design, to point to ideal standard models for
   design legislation suitable for the European Economic Community, and in
   particular for the concept of novelty as the dividing line between an
   imitation or "copy" which qualifies for protection and one which does
   not. A glance at the laws of the Member States in the matter of designs
   shows instead that under the legislation of the other Member States, in
   this field rights are to a certain extent created for the protection of
   the "copying" of antique designs, designs from other cultures, etc. As
   a rule, the individual laws on designs establish the dividing line
   between "copying" which qualifies for protection and an imitation which
   does not solely by reference to the concept of novelty which, as is
   known, spans a range of variation from subjective to absolutely
   objective novelty. With regard to this concept, too, it cannot be the
   Court's task, contrary tothe view expressed by the appellant, to bring
   into line with each other the as yet unharmonized laws of the
   individual Member States in regard to designs.

   3.

   In its second question, the court making the reference finally seeks to
   ascertain whether the proprietor of a right in a design in the
   Netherlands may prevent the importation of products of an identical
   design if such products have been lawfully marketed in another Member
   State. In order to answer this question, it is necessary once again to
   refer to the distinction drawn by the Court in its established case-law
   between the existence and the exercise of industrial property rights.
   Even though it is quite clear that under Community law as it stands at
   present, a right in a design lawfully acquired in a Member State may in
   principle be relied upon pursuant to the first sentence of Article 36
   of the Treaty to prevent the importation of goods which, as regards
   their design, display characteristics identical to those of the
   protected design, it remains to be considered whether the exercise of
   such a right constitutes "a means of arbitrary discrimination" or "a
   disguised restriction on trade between Member States" within the
   meaning of the second sentence of Article 36 of the Treaty.

   In order to define the limits of the lawful exercise of mdustnal and
   commercial property rights under Article 36, the Court of Justice has
   developed the principle that the proprietor of an industrial and
   commercial propertv right which is protected by the legal provisioni of
   a Member State may not rely on those provisions in order to prevent the
   importation of a product which has been lawfully marketed in another
   Member State by himself or with his consent. ( [8]7 )

   If the proprietor of the protected right were entitled to rely on those
   provisions, he would have the opportunity to partition national markets
   and thus restrict trade between the Member States even though no such
   restriction were needed to enable him to preserve the substance of the
   exclusive rights deriving from the protected right.

   It should also be said, in regard to the submissions of the United
   Kingdom and of the French Government on this point, that it is beyond
   doubt, at least since the Court's judgment in the Merck case ( [9]8 )
   that once the proprietor of an industrial property right has lawfully
   marketed the protected product in a Member State or the product has
   been placed on the market there with his consent, that product may be
   freely bought and sold throughout the common market without there being
   any need to consider whether or not the proprietor was afforded any
   protection in the Member State concerned. If, on the other hand, the
   protected product is manufactured or marketed in a Member State without
   the consent of the proprietor, the latter may prevent the importation
   of that product into the protected area.

   Finally, another problem stems from the fact that under the Uniform
   BeneluxLaw a right in a design arises upon the filing of the design and
   that the person filing the design and the author of the design are not
   necessarily one and the same person, which may lead to the result that
   parallel industrial property rights which are identical in origin may
   arise in different Member Sutes. In that connection, it should be noted
   that in so far as the proprietors of such rights in a design which are
   identical in origin are linked by legal or economic ties from which a
   single origin of the design may be inferred, they may not, on the basis
   of an analogous application of the case-law of the Court on trade marks
   which are identical in origin, ( [10]9 )exercise the powers vested in
   them by national law for the purpose of preventing the importation of
   products having that protected design; otherwise it would be possible
   to partition national markets artificially by means of rights in a
   design which are identical in origin and exist concurrently in the
   individual Member States. Such, in particular, is the case, according
   to the case-law of the Court, where the exercise of such rights in the
   subject-matter, means or consequence of an agreement or concerted
   practice prohibited by the Treaty.

   Parallel rights in a design may not, however, be regarded as identical
   in origin if, although they are based on imitations or even on the
   appropriation of any original work created by a third party, there is
   no legal or economic connection, beyond the common origin of the
   designs, between the individual applicants for registration.

   If, therefore, in such a case, the identical origin of the designs were
   recognized solely on the ground that both of the designs concerned can
   be traced back to the same creative work, the legislation governing
   rights in a design in those Member States which merely require a design
   to be filed for an industrial property right to come into existence
   would, as the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany rightly
   points out, ultimately and quite unacceptably be deprived of its
   substance.

   However, it is for the court hearing the case to determine the nature
   of the relations existing between individual proprietors of the right
   and whether such rights in a design, which are identical in origin but
   differ from one Member State to another, are in the circumstances of
   the case exercised by a proprietor with the aim of partitioning
   markets.

   4.

   In conclusion, I propose that in the light of the above considerations
   the question submitted by the Gerechtshof should be answered as
   follows:

   1.

   Anieles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty are to be interpreted as not
   precluding the application of legal provisions of the Member States
   which confer on the first person to file the design exclusive rights
   thereto, when no person other than the author of the design, the person
   commissioning of employing the author or the person entitled under the
   author has the opportunity to challenge that right on the ground that
   the person filing the design is not its author or the person
   commissioning or employing the author.

   2.

   The proprietor of a right in a design acquired under the law of a
   Member State may not under Article 36 of the EEC Treaty rely on his
   exclusive right in order to prevent the importation of a product which
   has been lawfully marketed in another Member State either by himself or
   with his consent. However, the legal proprietor's exclusive right is
   enforceable in so far as the protected product has been marketed in a
   Member State without his consent. Such conduct may, however, constitute
   a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
   between Member States within the meaning of the second sentence of
   Article 36 of the EEC Treaty if it is demonstrated that the proprietor
   exercises his right with the aim of artificially partitioning markets.
     __________________________________________________________________

   ( [11]1 ) Translated from the German.

   ( [12]2 ) Judement of 15 June 1976 in. Case [13]51/75 EMI Records
   Limites v CBS United Kingaom Limited [1976] ECR 811.

   Judgment of 15 june 1976 in Case [14]86/75 EMI Records Limited v CBS
   Grammojon A/S [l976] ECR 871.

   Judment of 15 June 1976 in Case [15]96/75 EMI Records Limited v CBS
   Schaliplatten GmbH [1976] ECR 913

   ( [16]3 ) Juggment of 14. 2. 1980 in Case 53/79 Office National des
   Pensions pour Travailleurs Salariés v Florante Damiani [1980] ECR 273

   ( [17]4 ) Judgment of 8 June 1971 in Case [18]78/79 Deutsche Crobmarate
   GmbH \Metro-SB-Crobmarate (GmbH 6 Co. KG [1971] ECR 487

   ( [19]5 ) Judgment of 22 January 1981 in joined Cases [20]55 and 57/82
   (Muss. I erineb membran GmbH and Kiel inter. njnonj. CEMA [1981] ECR
   147.

   ( [21]6 ) Sec ludgmeni o! 29 February 1968 in Cut [22]24/76 Parke, Davu
   & Co. v Provet, Hette, Betntema-Interpharm arui Centralam [1968] ECR
   55.

   ( [23]7 ) See for example

   Judgment of 31 October 1974 in Case [24]15/74 Ceni'jrjrm B1 and AJnajn
   de Preppers Steeling Drag in [1974]. ECR 1147 [parallel parents]..

   Judgment of 22 June 1976 in Case [25]119/75 Terranova Indusne C.A
   Kapterer & Co [1976] ECR 1939.

   Judgment of 8 June 1971 in Case 78/79 Dentsche t.rjmmnrho Metro usee
   footnote 1 at page 2879].

   Judgment of 28 January 1981 in Joined Cases 55 and 57'k: GEMA see
   footnote 2 at page 2879].

   ( [26]8 ) Judgment of 14 July 1981 in Case 187/80 Merek & Co. in. v
   liefhar BV and Petrut Stephanin Exier [198l] FCR 2863

   ( [27]9 ) See Judement o' 18 February 1971 in Case [28]40/70 Vm EDA Srl
   ana Oters [1971] ECR 69.

   Judement of 13 July 1974 in Case 192/73 Van Zuylen hr'n Hag AG [1974]
   ECR 731

References

   1. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0001
   2. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0002
   3. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0003
   4. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0004
   5. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0005
   6. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0006
   7. file:///../../legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=OJ:L:1976:017:TOC
   8. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0007
   9. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0008
  10. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#t-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0009
  11. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0001
  12. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0002
  13. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61975??0051&locale=EN
  14. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61975??0086&locale=EN
  15. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61975??0096&locale=EN
  16. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0003
  17. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0004
  18. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61979??0078&locale=EN
  19. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0005
  20. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61982??0055&locale=EN
  21. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0006
  22. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61967??0024&locale=EN
  23. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0007
  24. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61974??0015&locale=EN
  25. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61975??0119&locale=EN
  26. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0008
  27. file:///tmp/lynxXXXXLRGiCr/L110547-4348TMP.html#c-ECRCJ1982ENA.0800287501-E0009
  28. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61970??0040&locale=EN