OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL LENZ
delivered on 16 April 1986 ( *1 )
Mr President,
Members of the Court,
A —
The key question in the case on which I am to deliver an Opinion today is whether the subscription of additional capital by State authorities to an industrial undertaking can be regarded as aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the EEC Treaty.
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1 |
The preamble to that decision includes the following grounds:
With regard to the procedure, the Commission states in its decision that the Governments of four other Member States, one trade association and two individual firms from the industry share the Commission's reservations about the Belgian aid. With the exception of one of the Member States in question, they emphasized the serious distortions of competition which, they considered, would arise as a result of the repeated assistance granted by the Belgian Government. |
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2. |
On 11 February 1985 the Belgian Government brought an action for a declaration that the Commission's decision of 24 October 1984 was void. By order of 12 June 1985 the Court gave the United Kingdom leave to intervene in support of the Commission's conclusions. The Kingdom of Belgium considers the Commission's decision to be unlawful on several grounds. The Belgian Government claims that the Court should:
The Commission claims that the Court should:
The Commission adheres to its decision on the grounds which it gave in that decision, which it sets out in more detail. The United Kingdom, intervening, claims that the Court should:
I shall discuss the individual legal arguments of the parties in more detail later. |
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3. |
At the Court's request, the Belgian Government produced further details about the recipient undertaking — development of its capital, ownership, turnover, market share, etc. The Commission produced its correspondence with the Belgian Government. I shall consider those matters later. |
B —
Since, during the oral proceedings, the Belgian Government, on the basis of the judgment in Case 52/84, withdrew the argument that it was legally impossible for it to comply with the Commission's decision, the following three claims of the Belgian Government still have to be considered:
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(i) |
The contested holding does not constitute an aid within the meaning of Article 92 (1) of the EEC Treaty (the first claim) ; |
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(ii) |
The decision has an inadequate statement of reasons, in so far as it does not establish in what respect the contested capital holdings affect trade between the Member States and distort competition (the second claim); |
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(iii) |
Infringement of the right to a fair hearing in so far as the Commission did not give the Belgian Government access to the submissions of the Member States, the trade associations and the undertakings which took part in the administrative procedure (the fourth claim). |
Furthermore, consideration should be given to whether the derogation provided for in Article 92 (3) of the EEC Treaty applies. The Belgian Government did not make an express claim to that effect but it can be inferred from its argument that it should also be considered whether the contested capital holding can be regarded as being compatible with the common market (the third claim).
1. The question whether the contested capital holding constitutes an aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the EEC Treaty
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(a) |
The Belgian Government considers that, by prohibiting the Region of Wallonia, as principal shareholder in the undertaking in question, from taking part in the contested increase in capital, the Commission discriminates against that body by comparison with a private shareholder. It is not clear how the Region's action differs from that which a private shareholder would have taken in the same circumstances. The fact that an undertaking is experiencing difficulties does not mean that a shareholder should disengage itself from it and precipitate its collapse. It is normal for a shareholder to support the restructuring of the undertaking by subscribing additional capital. Consequently, the Commission is prohibiting action which is usual when carried out by private shareholders — the provision of support for profitable but temporarily loss-making activities — simply because it is being carried out by the State as shareholder. To apply Article 92 of the Treaty in such a way as to impose standards of behaviour which, in the final analysis, discriminate against the public authorities conflicts with the guarantee of the systems of property ownership in the various Member States which is laid down in Article 222 of the EEC Treaty. In addition, the Belgian Government argues that the Commission's argument is fundamentally flawed in so far as it bases its claims on the undertaking's aggregate results and ignores the specific results of the ceramic sanitaryware division, which is the only division at issue in these proceedings. The results of the ceramic sanitaryware division have steadily improved over the years: losses of BFR 120 million in 1981 and BFR 72 million in 1982 have given way to a profit of BFR 6 million in 1983. As a result, the Commission's claim that the Region of Wallonia used the contested increase in capital to finance an unviable business is based on a false premise. In the Commission's opinion, the view of the law put forward by the applicant amounts to putting State undertakings in a privileged position in so far as it argues in effect that authorities of the Member States are not bound in the case of State undertakings to comply with the competition rules, in particular as regards aid, in the same way that private undertakings are. That assumption manifestly conflicts with Article 90 (1) of the EEC Treaty, which provides that, in the case of public undertakings, Member States are neither to enact nor to maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaty, in particular to the rules provided for in Articles 85 to 94. At the time when the aid was granted the company had been making a loss for a long time, despite the previous injections of capital. As a result, and since the capital injection in question constitutes rescue aid which was vital in order to offset operating losses, it could not be intended to support alleged restructuring efforts. The continuing losses incurred by Boch SA and the succession of operations mounted until early 1985 with a view to staving off its liquidation clearly show that the survival of the undertaking was due solely to the State support. Consequently, the subscription of capital by the Region of Wallonia was made under circumstances which would not have been acceptable to- a private shareholder. Hence it constitutes an aid within the meaning of Article 92 (1) of the EEC Treaty. In order to assess the undertaking's operating results, the Commission based itself on its aggregate results because it did not receive from the Belgian Government the information necessary in connection with proceedings under Article 93 of the EEC Treaty. The undertaking's annual accounts draw no distinction between the results of the crockery division and those of the sanitaryware division. Consequently the Commission was unable to provide detailed particulars of the various trading sectors of the undertaking. Besides, in the Commission's view the information now provided by the Belgian Government leads to the same conclusion that it reached in the absence of that information. The United Kingdom, intervening, essentially concurs with the arguments put forward by the Commission. In addition, it contends that the circumstances under which the contested provision of capital — and likewise other injections of capital — was made suggest that it was not part of a coordinated plan to restructure the undertaking in question. As a result, the Commission was entitled to conclude that such provision of capital took on the character of State aid. |
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(b) |
Under Article 92 of the EEC Treaty any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market. The only exception is aid which is compatible with the common market by virtue of Article 92 (2) of the EEC Treaty and aid which may be considered to be compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 92 (3).
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Such conduct is not consonant with the duties of a Member State under Articles 92, 93 and 5 of the EEC Treaty. In order to ensure the progressive development and functioning of the common market in accordance with the provisions of Article 92, Article 93 provides for constant review of aid granted or planned by the Member States, ‘an operation which assumes constant cooperation between these States and the Commission’, as the Court stated in its judgment of 2 July 1974 in Case 173/73, which has already been cited on several occasions.
The very wording of the first sentence of Article 93 (3) — the Commission is to be informed of any plans to grant aid — as well as the meaning and intention of that provision point to the existence of a comprehensive duty to notify on the part of the Member States, since the very existence of differences of opinion between the Commission and the Member States regarding the permissibility of an aid should be avoided as far as possible. Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that there may be considerable difficulty in eliminating the results of an aid which was granted illegally. The arguments adduced in connection with Case 52/84 provide a clear example.
If it is the duty not of the Member States but of the Commission to consider whether an aid is permissible in Community law, that division of responsibilities must also apply with regard to the question whether an aid is involved at all.
The obligation to notify which is set out in Article 93 (3) of the EEC Treaty therefore does not only cover measures which unquestionably constitute aid, in which case it only has to be considered whether they are compatible with the EEC Treaty, but also to measures whose very character as aid may appear to be in doubt.
That is true in particular of measures taken by the Member States with regard to undertakings of which they are the proprietors, since in such cases it can frequently only be determined by thorough investigation whether the State acted simply as an entrepreneur or in its capacity as a public authority.
Since all measures which relate to public undertakings and are also only ‘suspected’ of being aid must be notified to the Commission, the Belgian Government cannot exculpate itself by stating that it did not have to notify the capital increase in question because it did not consider the increase to have been aid.
2. Whether the contested aid adversely affects trade between the Member States and distorts competition
Since the granting of aid, especially in the form of the acquisition of participations by the State or by public bodies cannot be regarded as being automatically contrary to the Treaty, it should now be considered whether the contested aid conflicted with Article 92 (1) of the EEC Treaty. In particular, it must be established whether the aid distorts competition or threatens to distort competition and whether it affects trade between Member States.
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(a) |
The Belgian Government considers that it is not apparent from the Commission's decision to what extent the capital subscription at issue affects trade between Member States or distorts or threatens to distort competition. In addition — an objection also raised by the Court in its judgments of 14 November 1984 in Case 323/82 and of 13 March 1985 in Joined Cases 296 and 318/82 ( 13 ) — the Commission has provided no specific indication of the way in which the aid in question distorted competition; the Commission's decision does not contain the slightest information concerning the situation on the relevant market, the market share of the undertaking concerned, the pattern of trade between Member States in the products in question or the undertaking's exports. The Belgian Government states that the decision merely notes the objections raised by the governments of Member States, one trade association and two other companies in the sector concerned. Furthermore, it claims that the investment was designed to bring about rationalizations and did not result in any increase in capacity. In the Commission's view the contested decision clearly explains that the aid in question is liable to affect the conditions of competition particularly seriously, since in the normal course of events market forces would have made it necessary for Boch SA to have closed down, which would have enabled more efficient competitors to expand. The market situation is also clearly described as being characterized by overcapacity and by very intense intra-Community trade. The position of Boch SA on the relevant market is described as being that of an undertaking which in 1983 exported more than 70% of its output to other Member States. In addition, the Commission provided further details of the undertaking's market share in various Member States of the Community and of aggregate Belgian exports of ceramic sanitaryware, which showed that Belgium's share of intra-Community trade in the sector in question has risen from 19.4% in 1979 to 34.8% in 1983. In the Commission's view, the repeated aid enabled Boch SA better to utilize its production capacity and to sell its products on the Community market at any price it liked. The United Kingdom also contends that the aid granted distorts competition and affects trade between Member States. The provision of capital must have a major impact in keeping in business a company making such substantial losses. The United Kingdom contends that it is an undisputed fact that Boch SA entered into intra-Community trade. That view is supported by the fact that imports of sanitaryware from Belgium, in comparison with imports from other Member States, have increased considerably whilst the general tendancy has been for imports to decrease. |
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(b) |
In the first place, it must be observed that the explanations in the contested decision as to whether the aid in question affects trade between Member States and distorts competition are very brief. The only facts mentioned are that Boch SA exported more than 70% of its output of sanitaryware to other Member States and that at the same time the market is characterized by excess capacity in the ceramics sector. On the basis of an assumption that in the normal course of events the free play of competition would have caused the undertaking in question to have to close, it is concluded that had the aid not been granted more efficient competitors would have been able to expand. |
It is in fact correct that there is no evidence as to the market share of the undertaking in question or as to trade patterns in the products concerned. The Commission provided no particulars of Boch SA's market share in the Member States of the Community or of its prices until the proceedings before the Court.
Certainly the Commission was not obliged to set out in its decision all the details bearing on the outcome. However, it had to give the main reasons for the decision; accordingly, additional details furnished at a later time can be taken into account only in so far as they relate to matters which are in substance already set out in the decision or which might be assumed to be generally known.
Since, as far as the Commission was concerned, it was an established fact that Boch SA exported 70% of its output of sanitaryware to other Member States of the Community — in the proceedings before the Court it became clear that over 70% of its total production was exported, mostly to Member States of the Community — the Commission was entitled, in my view, to assume that artificially keeping Boch in existence was in itself bound to distort competition and affect trade between the Member States. The considerable proportion of Boch's production accounted for by exports suggested, in conjunction with the total volume of its production, which had to be disclosed pursuant to Directive No 68/151 ( 14 ) and hence is deemed to be known, that Boch was substantially involved in intra-Community trade. In view of the fact that, in addition, the undertaking's survival was due only to State aid or, to put it the other way, that without State aid Boch SA would have been unable to continue trading, trade between the Member States was indeed affected. Since the aid consisted of an advantage which in the normal course of events would not have been obtained on the market, it must be assumed in case of doubt that it improved the undertaking's competitiveness vis-à-vis rival undertakings which did not receive similar advantages, and hence distorted competition.
In view of Boch's aggregate turnover and its export activities, the Commission was therefore entitled to assume that Boch's continuing existence itself distorted competition and affected trade between Member States. The closure of Boch would have enabled more efficient competitors to expand both on the Belgian market and on the markets of the other Member States, which in that event would no longer have been supplied by Boch.
The Commission's decision would certainly have been clearer and plainer had it included particulars of Boch's volume of business in absolute terms (however, they can be calculated from the losses and the percentages of turnover mentioned in the decision) and of its market share in Belgium and in the Community. However, in my view such particulars were not absolutely imperative in order to reach the view set out in the contested decision. Indeed, the decision appears to me to be sufficiently supported by facts and sufficiently reasoned.
It should be mentioned once more in this connection that the brief statement of facts and reasons in the decision is largely due to the conduct of the Belgian Government, which, in breach of the duties imposed upon it by Articles 93 and 5 of the EEC Treaty, in no way cooperated with, even less supported, the procedure initiated by the Commission for investigating the aid. In view of such defective cooperation on the part of the Member State concerned, the onus on the Commission of providing explanations and reasons should not be excessively strict. After all, when investigating aid the Commission does not have the powers available which it has, for instance, in connection with the procedure for supervising competition, which it can use to obtain the required particulars if need be by threatening to apply or actually applying coercive measures.
In the final analysis, I therefore consider that the Commission has supported its decision with sufficient facts and reasons.
3.
Although, in line with its view that the capital holding in question does not constitute an aid, the Belgian Government did not expressly argue that Article 92 (3) has been infringed, I consider it to be necessary briefly to consider that derogation. Indeed, since the Belgian Government maintains that the increase in capital subscribed by the Region of Wallonia was made in connection with a programme of renovation, designed to result between 1981 and 1984 in rationalizing investments and a reduction in the number of staff employed, this can be seen as embodying the legal view that the contested aid might be regarded as being compatible with the common market within the meaning of Article 92 (3) of the EEC Treaty.
With regard to the possible application of Article 92 (3) of the EEC Treaty, the Commission's decision starts with a theoretical exposition. It then points out that Article 92 (3) (a) cannot be applied since the area in which Boch SA is established is not one where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment. Before the Court the Commission stated that it was referring to the situation in the Community as a whole. This is acceptable, since in its judgment of 17 September 1980 in Case 730/79 ( 15 ) the Court held that the Commission is entitled to assess the standard of living and underemployment in a particular area, not with reference to the national average, but in relation to the Community level.
As regards the possibility of considering an aid to be compatible with the common market under Article 92 (3) (b) of the EEC Treaty, the Commission stated that Belgium was one of the Community's central areas; although its social and economic problems were not among the most serious in the Community it did present the greatest danger of escalating subsidies and any aid granted was likely to affect trade between Member States. Furthermore, it did not appear from available economic and social data with regard to Belgium that there was a serious disturbance in its economy within the meaning of the Treaty.
Those explanations also appear to me to be clear; in any event, the Belgian Government has not put forward anything capable of seriously shaking them.
There remains therefore only the derogation provided for in Article 92 (3) (c) of the EEC Treaty. The Commission stated that that derogation was inapplicable on the ground that the situation of the ceramics industry suggested that to preserve production capacity through State aid was against the common interest.
That succinct explanation might make it seem possible to draw the conclusion — which the Belgian Government draws with reference to the judgment of the Court of 13 March 1985 in Joined Cases 296 and 318/82 —that the Commission failed to take into account an important factor which might possibly have led to a different assessment, that is to say that the aid in question was related to the restructuring of the recipient undertaking.
In the event that this should be the case the contested decision would have to be declared void in the same way as the decision which resulted in the judgment of 13 March 1985 in Joined Cases 296 and 318/82. However, I consider that that is not the case.
Although the existence of the alleged programme of renovation for the undertaking concerned for the period 1981 to 1984 was notified to the Commission, the Belgian Government did not submit the actual programme either to the Commission during the aid review procedure or to the Court of Justice in the course of the judicial proceedings. That circumstance itself, in conjunction with the undertaking's record of increasing losses and its ultimate liquidation, suggests that the so-called programme of renovation cannot have been a viable restructuring plan. However, that assumption does not have to be examined further, since during the oral proceedings the Belgian Government stated that the actual restructuring did not take place until after the liquidation of the company in January 1985, which resulted in the undertaking discontinuing its activities in the crockery sector and continuing its business in the sanitaryware sector through a new company, Noviboch SA.
In the final analysis, therefore, the existence of a restructuring plan, which might possibly have enabled the State rescue or rehabilitation aid to be seen in another light, ( 16 ) was neither claimed nor proved.
Consequently, there are no grounds casting doubt on the legality of the Commission's finding that the aid granted by the State authorities of the Kingdom of Belgium could not be regarded as being compatible with the common market under Article 92 (3) of the EEC Treaty.
4. Infringement of the right to a fair hearing
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(a) |
The Belgian government points out that, according to the contested decision, the Commission received submissions from the governments of four other Member States, one trade association and two individual firms from the sector concerned, stating that they shared ‘the Commission's concern about the Belgian Government's assistance of the company’ and in which they considered that the repeated assistance given to Boch would cause serious distortions of competition. The Belgian Government contends that it was never informed of the substance of those submissions or of the identity of the parties who made them. For that reason, it could not prepare its defence effectively. Moreover, it considers it paradoxical that it, in its capacity as a Member State, received less information about the complaints made about the contested capital holding than a nonmember country which is the subject of antidumping proceedings pursuant to Council Regulation No 2176/84 ( 17 ) would have received. It is provided that in such proceedings interested parties and, in particular, representatives of the exporting country may inspect all information made available to the Commission by any party to any investigation and are entitled to be informed of the essential facts and considerations on which the Community authorities base themselves. In the Commission's view, the aim of its giving notice to interested parties to submit observations is solely to enable it to compile all the information necessary in order for it to evaluate the compatibility of the aid with the common market. Consequently, in the case of aid, there is no adversary procedure comparable to that which exists in the field of competition rules applicable to undertakings (Article 85 et seq. of the EEC Treaty). Moreover, as a result of the duty to preserve official secrecy in accordance with Article 214 of the EEC Treaty the Commission is not in a position to pass on the submissions of the parties in question, since they may contain data internal to the undertakings concerned, including confidential data. If the Commission failed to observe a certain discretion in that area third parties might be dissuaded from bringing certain matters to its notice, which would prevent it from performing its duties correctly. As for the comparison made with antidumping procedures, this simply shows that action by the Community legislature is necessary in order to be able to invoke an arrangement of the type claimed by the Belgian Government. In the United Kingdom's view, the EEC Treaty does not specify that the Commission should pass the comments of other parties on to the Member State notifying the aid. However, on the grounds of fairness it might be appropriate to imply such an obligation. A categorical answer to this question is not possible but depends on consideration of the individual case in question. The Commission is not under an obligation to notify the comments of other parties where these raise no points which have not already been considered in the comments of the Member State notifying the aid. Similarly, the Commission may be unable to disclose certain information on grounds of commercial confidentiality. Exceptionally, however, there may be circumstances where the comments of other parties raise new points which may substantially affect the Commission's decision. In such a case it is appropriate for the Commission to give the Member State concerned a further opportunity to comment before the Commission takes its final decision. |
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(b) |
In principle the Belgian Government is correct in its contention that before an administrative decision is taken the party concerned must have the opportunity of putting forward its point of view on the points on which the decision is based. The Court expressly recognized that in particular in its judgment of 13 February 1979 in Case 85/76 ( 18 ) and in its judgment of 20 March 1985 in Case 264/82. ( 19 ) |
However, it does not follow that the Member State concerned has in every case the right to examine the submissions made to the Commission. In fact, in the event the Commission may be debarred from disclosing certain communications on the ground of confidentiality pursuant to the principle of official secrecy laid down in Article 214 of the EEC Treaty. ( 20 ) However, the corollary of that is simply that the Commission cannot rely on such communications in the administrative procedure and that since they were not disclosed to the persons concerned they cannot be used as grounds for its decision. ( 21 )
The Commission's contention that in the absence of legislation governing the right to inspect documents in the context of the aid procedure there can be no such right is certainly not correct at that level of generality, since the right to information about the subject-matter of the charge arises simply out of the right to a fair hearing. The Belgian Government stated in the course of the oral proceedings that it was treated worse than a nonmember country would be treated under Regulation No 2176/84 (antidumping or anti-subsidy procedure). Consequently the question of the application of that regulation by analogy might arise.
In the result, however, it is not necessary to resolve this issue definitively, even if reliance is not placed on the fact that, as the Belgian Government itself admitted during the oral proceedings, it never applied to the Commission to examine the documents in question. The Commission decision refers to the submissions of the other parties involved in the procedure only in so far as it states that the latter share the Commission's reservations about the aid and that some of them referred to the serious distortion of competition to which the aid would give rise.
The fact that some of the participants shared the Commission's reservations is certainly not a matter on which the Belgian Government should have been heard. Rather, it constitutes an assessment of facts of which the Belgian Government was in any case aware. The same applies to the reference made to the fact that some of the participants stressed the serious distortions of competition to which the repeated grant of aid would give rise. The Commission provided evidence for distortions of competition on the basis of facts which it could establish even without submissions to that effect from the parties concerned.
As a result, the contested decision is not based on the views submitted to the Commission by the other participants mentioned.
The participants' submissions were of significance, at most, in so far as they reinforced the Commission's view with regard to the legal assessment of the conduct of the Belgian Government. However, it is not apparent that the Belgian Government's interests were adversely affected by the withholding of the participants' submissions, since the facts on which the Commission's decision were based were fully known to the Belgian Government: the export business of Boch SA, Boch SA's losses and the fact that those losses were offset by State authorities.
C —
In the light of the foregoing I propose that the Court should dismiss the application and order the applicant to pay the Commission's costs. No order need be made concerning the intervener's costs since it has made no such application.
( *1 ) Translated from the German.
( 1 ) Sec the notices published in the Moniteur belge of 10 December 1981 and 25 August 1983, respectively
( 2 ) Judgment of 15 January 1986 in Case 52/84 commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 89.
( 3 ) Official Journal 1985. L. 59. p. 21
( 4 ) ‘Withdrawn’ should correctly read ‘abolished’, since the French and Dutch texts of the decision, which are the only authentic versions, are based in that respect on the wording of Article 93 (2) of the FIX Treats
( 5 ) Judgment of 14 November 1984 in Case 323/82 SA Intermills v Commission [1984] ECR 3809.
( 6 ) Judgment of 23 February 1961 in Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR I, at p. 19.
( 7 ) Judgment of 22 March 1977 in Case 78/76 Firma Steinike und Weinlig v federal Republic of Germany [1977] ECR 595
( 8 ) Judgment of 2 July 1974 in Case 173/73 Italian Government v Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECR 709.
( 9 ) Commission Directive of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings, Official Journal 1980, L 195, p. 35.
( 10 ) Judgment of 6 July 1982 in Joined Cases 188 to 190/80 French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nortbem Ireland v Coinintsnon of the European Coinmunities [1982] ECR 2545.
( 11 ) Judgment of 2 July 1974 in Case 173/73, loc. cit., paragraph 12.
( 12 ) Judgment of 15 January 1986 in Case 52/84 Commisiion v Belgium [1986] ECR 89.
( 13 ) Judgmcni of 13 March 1985 in Joined Cases 296 and 318/82 Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabrik v Commission of the European Communities [1985] ECR 809.
( 14 ) First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the seconds paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community, Official Journal, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 41.
( 15 ) Judgment of 17 September 1980 in Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, at pp. 2691 and 2692.
( 16 ) See in this connection the aforementioned judgments of 14 November 1984 in Case 323/82, paragraph 39, and of 13 March 1985 in Joined Cases 296 and 318/82, paragraph 26.
( 17 ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community, Official Journal 1984, L 201, p 1.
( 18 ) Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 461, at p. 510 et seq. (competition procedure).
( 19 ) Judgment of 20 March 1985 in Case 264/82 Ttmex Corporation and Others v Council and Commission [1985] ECR 849 (antidumping procedure).
( 20 ) See my Opinion of 22 January 1986 in Case 53/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] ECR 1965.
( 21 ) See the judgment of 13 February 1979 in Case 85/76, loc.cit., at pp. 512 and 513 (paragraph 14).